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Japan currently faces a demographic crisis resulting from declines in fertility rates and 
rapid expansion of Japan’s elderly population. Public pensions will come under immense 
strain as shrinking numbers of working age people are forced to support ever more retirees. 
At the same time, declines in fertility and falling population figures threaten Japan’s future 
economic growth and vitality.  
This thesis investigates the relationship between the demographic crisis and Japan’s 
strict immigration policies. Policymakers continue to refuse to allow migration to Japan in 
order to offset declines in Japan’s own working age population. The thesis aims to explain 
why Japan remains so reluctant to accept migrant workers from abroad, even though this may 
offer a solution to the problems of demographic decline and depopulation.  
I contend that conventional analyses of Japan’s immigration policies do not provide 
adequate explanations for why Japan continues to exclude foreign labourers. Rather, I argue 
that Japan’s attitude must be understood in connection with a binary, “us-and-them” mindset 
toward foreign countries and communities collectively that exists in Japan’s governing and 
bureaucratic institutions. This mindset is evident in Japan’s practical labour policy 
implementation, and has important cultural and political implications for Japan’s public 
discourses of national identity and interests.  
The thesis argues that Japan remains unwilling to accept migrant labourers because of 
an immigration policy structure that resolutely adheres to an outdated view of migrants as 
mere units of labour. This overlooks changed global models of migration that prioritise 
human rights, proactive social integration and strategic selection of migrants. While Japan 
could ease the effects of depopulation and demographic decline by revising core policy 
assumptions in order to effectively integrate migrants into the dwindling national workforce, 
it has so far failed to engage with newer models of migration. My analysis locates Japan’s 
crisis within a wider context of global demographic change and transnational population 
movement in the twenty-first century. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the early years of the twenty-first century, Japan faces a number of complicated 
social, cultural and economic problems. Many of these problems pose challenges to core 
assumptions at the heart of Japan’s economic success over the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Twenty years of stagnant growth rates following the collapse of the ‘bubble 
economy’ have undermined Japan’s international prestige and reversed many of the 
economic gains of ‘Japan Inc.’ and the ‘economic miracle’. A similar sense of stagnation 
afflicts Japan’s domestic politics, with a succession of ineffectual governments and prime 
ministerial resignations hurting public confidence in the nation’s democratic institutions. 
Recent events in northern Japan following the destructive earthquake and tsunami of March 
2011 - and the ensuing nuclear crisis at Fukushima - have held back long-awaited indications 
of economic recovery, depressed public spirits and further diminished public belief in the 
competence of Japan’s powerful bureaucratic state management structure. 
 One of the most acute and far-reaching social and economic challenges facing Japan 
in the early twenty-first century is that of demographic change, depopulation and the rapid 
ageing of Japanese society. The problem is complex: faced with a declining national birth 
rate, a rapidly-expanding population of senior citizens, and a dwindling labour force, Japan’s 
tax-funded national pension and health schemes may soon be unable to adequately support a 
‘top-heavy’ elderly society. Meanwhile, Japan’s overall population figures reached a peak in 
December 2004 and have fallen consistently ever since then, by as many as 183,000 during 
2009 alone. At current rates, Japan’s total population is projected to decline by as much as 25 
percent by the year 2050 (Statistics Bureau Japan, 2010, pp. 9-10). 
 Confronted with this situation, Japan’s policymakers have been forced to contemplate 
reform of immigration regulations, thereby allowing greater numbers of legal migrants into 
Japan as a ready source of labour. This proposition strikes an emotively-charged note in 
Japan’s elite political and bureaucratic circles as well as within mainstream society. Scholars 
of Japan and casual visitors alike frequently note an apparent absence of foreign residents 
from Japan’s mainstream social milieu. Nevertheless, Japan’s current status as a world power 
rests almost solely upon the pillars of continued economic strength and export production, 
both of which are threatened by an explosion in the relative number of retirees drawing health 
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and pension benefits from a pool of public funds provided by an ever-dwindling number of 
workers. It is projected now that Japan will be forced to accept a significant influx of 
working-age people from abroad if it is to avoid a critical shortage of working-age 
contributors to the national pension system (Harlan, 2010). 
 Yet, review of immigration and citizenship regulations reveals that Japanese society 
remains largely closed to foreigners in policy terms. Indeed, many of the policy structures 
surrounding non-Japanese involvement in Japan’s economy and society seem deliberately 
intended to exclude foreign individuals and communities. As Harlan (2010) states, “Japan has 
long had deep misgivings about immigration and has tightly controlled the ability of 
foreigners to live and work [in Japan]”. 
 Many commentators on Japan have proposed that policymakers might potentially 
lessen the impact of demographic change by legitimising the systematic hiring of migrant 
workers from abroad. Such a policy would necessitate considerable reform of entrenched 
social policies and attitudes in order to integrate those migrants into the social and economic 
fabric of twenty-first century Japan. Considering the extent of present restrictions on the 
lifestyles and activities of migrants in Japan, questions arise regarding the nature of the 
transformation that Japanese society would be compelled to undergo to effectively 
incorporate migrant labour into the national economy. By legitimising hiring from abroad, 
Japan might aim to offset the harsher economic effects of demographic change and facilitate 
the provision of social services at a higher level to a greater proportion of its citizens for a 
longer period. This could be achieved by way of immigration policy reform: by providing 
greater access to Japan’s labour market for migrant workers, policymakers could potentially 
create an immediate shift in the proportion of working members of society to the elderly and 
retired. Variations on this idea have become subjects of public attention and debate in Japan 
in recent times. However, the current direction of Japan’s engagement with migrants makes 
clear that the present class of policymakers are unwilling to consider or even explore the 
possibility of this kind of reform on a theoretical level, let alone take the legislative steps 
necessary to bring such a reform into effect. Indeed, many current policymakers continue to 
resist the very idea of a liberalised migration regime. 
 Japan is famous internationally as an appealing work destination for foreign language 
teachers, entertainers and corporate staff. Thousands of highly-skilled foreign workers fill 
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niches in the Japanese labour market for which employers are unable to adequately source 
local labour. Japan also plays host to as many as a quarter of a million undocumented migrant 
workers and labourers, enabled by a variety of semi-legal or legally ambiguous hiring 
practices and labour initiatives that meet with the tacit approval of Japan’s policymakers and 
government. Stephen Castles (2004) describes this situation as “a way of managing the 
contradiction that Japan desperately needs unskilled workers, while public opinion will not 
accept a labour recruitment policy […] The authorities have opened various ‘side doors’ [to 
migration]. The ‘back door’ of irregular labour migration also appears to be tolerated” (p. 
216). Consequently, it cannot be argued that migrants (both legal and undocumented) are 
completely denied access to ways of earning a living in Japan. However, legitimising 
migration on this narrowly restricted scale clearly will not be adequate as a sustainable 
strategy to resolve Japan’s demographic problems. Meanwhile, Japan’s strict basic 
immigration policies remain resolutely in force, and continue to restrict the ability of migrant 
workers to participate substantively in Japan’s labour market. 
 This work aims to analyse and interpret this impasse and the tensions raised by 
emerging demographic crisis between socio-economic realities and the desire to maintain 
social, ethnic, cultural and political status-quo in Japan. The question this research seeks to 
answer is: Why does Japan resist taking the necessary steps to introduce immigration and 
citizenship reforms that could help to alleviate the negative economic impact of population 
decline? 
 Conventional responses to this question typically refer to well-established theories 
and assumptions of xenophobia, insularity and cultural intolerance in Japanese society. In 
contrast, this work will argue that the reasons for Japan’s reluctance to accept greater 
numbers of foreigners can best be explained in a more specific two-part process. The first 
part identifies an underlying binary, ‘us-and-them’ mindset held by Japan’s policymakers 
with regard to Japanese interaction with, and involvement in, globalised political and 
economic systems. Japan’s historical isolation created a mythology of cultural, political and 
ethnic ‘uniqueness’ that gradually became established as a fixed underlying principle of 
Japanese public policymaking and governance. Current immigration policies and attitudes to 
migrants in general extend upon this principle, reinforcing Japan’s isolation from modern 
global communities and systems. By considering the connections between these factors, it 
can be concluded that Japan’s reluctance to reform immigration policies arises from a view of 
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global affairs that contrasts Japan with other nations and cultures collectively, and that defines 
Japanese cultural and national identity in dualistic oppositional terms to other nations and 
foreign actors on the international stage. An anti-migrant orientation in government 
legitimises this viewpoint in Japanese mainstream society, and limits the scope of popular 
support for immigration reform initiatives. This situation creates a mutually-reinforcing 
negative cycle that acts to further strengthen resistance to migrants in Japan.    
 The second part of the argument relates to the nature of Japan’s engagement with 
developing transnational migration patterns in the decades since 1945. Since the economic 
recession of the mid-1970s, labour migration theorists and policymakers have developed a 
revised set of values and norms intended to negate or minimise the drawbacks of labour 
migration programmes that appeared as the first postwar age of economic prosperity in the 
developed world came to an end. These revised values and norms place increased emphasis 
on the human rights and welfare of migrant labourers, and aim strategically to reduce 
incentives for undocumented employment and overstaying. In contrast, Japan’s policymaking 
approach to future labour needs adheres closely to conventional postwar assumptions in the 
international community of the economic and social costs of expanding migrant employment 
within highly-developed economies. Primarily for this reason, failure to engage substantively 
with modern globalised communities and systems has caused Japan to persist with outdated 
restrictive immigration policies. 
 In general, transnational movement of labour in the globalised era has undergone new 
academic reinterpretation in conjunction with evolution of the economic and social 
significance of labour migration for the world economy. In the early twenty-first century, the 
advent of affordable travel and emerging migrant labour markets markedly changed life 
prospects and employment opportunities for migrant workers from developing countries. By 
applying recent theoretical paradigms of transnational labour migration to the context of 
Japan’s current socio-demographic and economic situation, it is possible to see how Japan’s 
policymaking elites have failed to respond to the crisis effectively, instead favouring long-
established conventional wisdom on the subject of immigration reform and migrant 
employment. This work will argue that policymakers’ aversion to conceptual constructions of 
Japan as part of an increasingly unified and universalised global system explains why they 
are unable to engage effectively with modern patterns of globalised population movement. 
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 I have chosen to focus on contemporary Japan in this specific context because it 
represents a prime case study in societal ageing, demographic decline and the problems of 
depopulation. Japan is currently the ‘oldest’ member country in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in terms of elderly as a proportion of 
overall population (OECD, 2009), and is second only to the Republic of Korea in terms of 
lowest OECD birth rates (OECD, 2007). As such, Japan’s current situation serves as an 
illustrative model for some of the destructive economic effects of demographic decline. 
Demographic changes in Japan also provide early indications of the potential outcomes of 
worldwide demographic change in the twenty-first century. The situation in Japan serves as 
an excellent reference point for comparison of social policy structures and institutional 
responses to depopulation around the world. Other highly-developed countries, particularly 
those in Pacific Asia and Europe, may regard Japan’s response to the crisis as a test case in 
formulating their own immigration policies and measures to combat demographic decline. 
From a migration theory perspective, Japan is an example of a country that will 
require a substantial replacement workforce in the future, as opposed to the supplementary 
workforce that most twentieth-century international guest worker programmes were intended 
to provide. This change in the dynamics of labour migration challenges core assumptions of 
past migration theories, and introduces new variables to the study of liberalised immigration 
in highly-developed countries. Given the projected outcomes of societal ageing, highly 
developed economies face new imperatives to develop workable migration solutions, having 
little alternative but to find some way of supplementing existing workforces in order to 
support burgeoning elderly populations. Japan’s official immigration platform, the Third 
Basic Plan for Immigration Control (issued in 2005), fails to take any of these kinds of 
problems or challenges into account, persisting instead with long-established definitions of 
‘favourable’ (that is, highly-skilled or specialised) migrants and ‘unfavourable’ migrants, 
built on an underlying policy premise of ‘no unskilled workers accepted’ (Solidarity Network 
with Migrants Japan, 2007, p. 10). In the context of discussing Japan’s reluctance to 
implement immigration reforms, this work will address the ongoing sustainability of refusing 
unskilled migrant workers at a time when Japan’s primary industries and social services face 
critical labour shortages. 
 Overall, this project aims to explain why Japan continues to refuse to accept migrants 
in the specific context of demographic decline, depopulation and associated socio-economic 
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problems. Many of the concepts and themes that emerge in the course of this discussion 
imply or directly raise further theoretical and practical questions that deserve in-depth 
attention and analysis – these include moral and ethical considerations relating to migrant 
labour, Japan’s unwillingness to accept refugees, and other related humanitarian issues. Some 
of these subjects have important connections and relevance to the central arguments here. 
However, moral considerations over the sustainability of transnational labour migration or 
potential immigration reforms in Japan fall outside the scope of this research and will not be 
discussed in detail.1 The emphasis of this work falls instead on developing an understanding 
of why Japan resists immigration reform, rather than addressing questions of whether Japan 
should aim to capitalise on the labour of migrant workers. Further, although Japan accepts a 
very low number of refugees and asylum seekers each year (for reasons closely related to 
those to be discussed in the body of this work), the aim here will be to analyse immigration 
policy and engagement with migrants as a targeted response to demographic decline and 
impending labour shortages. Above all, the central intention is to provide insight into the 
enigma of why Japan’s policymakers seem so reluctant to even consider the concept of 
reform, and why immigration reform is regarded with so little apparent urgency in Japan at 
present. 
 The chapter that follows assesses the current situation in Japan, providing an 
empirical outline of Japan’s demographic problems together with an account of official and 
public opposition to immigration reform. It addresses the viability of labour migration as a 
way of alleviating depopulation and demographic decline in Japan, referring to recent sources 
of information and analysis relevant to Japan’s reasons for refusing to engage with foreigners 
or to accept migrants. Chapter Three provides detailed analysis of common conventional 
explanations for why Japan continues to resist immigration reform, outlining the central 
elements of these explanations. I will argue that these conventional explanations are 
insufficient for the purpose of understanding Japan’s current stance on immigration in the 
context of depopulation and labour shortages.   
 Chapter Four identifies and discusses the key contributing factors that inform 
immigration policymaking in Japan. This chapter presents my alternative explanation for why 
                                                          
1
 Analyses of immigration policies and global migration based more specifically on humanitarian and moral 
grounds can be found in Jordan and Duvell (2003), and Juss (2006). Detailed discussion of Japan’s refugee 
policies can be found in Koizumi (1992) and Arakaki (2008). 
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Japan is reluctant to reform immigration policy, which comprises two central parts, as 
described above. The first part will address the historical context of Japan’s relations with 
foreigners, the implications of institutional hurdles to access to work and life opportunities 
for migrants in Japan, and socio-political trends of engagement with migrant communities in 
Japan. It will identify Japan’s essential binary ‘us-and-them’ worldview, based on the 
interaction of historical, practical and political factors, and explain why this worldview is a 
critical contributor to current immigration policies. The second part will explore the 
interaction of this worldview with the realities of transnational population movement on a 
global scale, revealing ways in which Japan’s present-day immigration policies reflect 
economic conditions and assumptions of a past era. It will investigate shifts in the economy 
of population movement from the ‘first phase’ of postwar temporary labour migration 
programmes (enacted in the decades immediately following the Second World War, based on 
neoclassical economic assumptions) to ‘second phase’ models (based on international norms, 
globalised values and strategic implementation) that continue to develop in the early years of 
the twenty-first century. Together, these two parts demonstrate that Japan essentially rejects 
immigration reform due to continued dominance of policy assumptions that no longer 
adequately reflect global realities. Overall, I contend that Japan still refuses to accept 
migrants as a result of crucial failures on the part of policymakers to respond effectively to 
globalising economic systems and transnational patterns of population movement. 
 Chapter Five concludes with a brief analysis of the implications of depopulation for 
policymaking in Japan, a broad comparison of Japan’s situation with that of other highly-
developed countries, and comments on the scholarly implications of this work. By weighing 
Japan’s policy responses against those of other countries, it is possible to gain insight into 
paths for potential future development of policies that respond effectively to the emerging 
demands of depopulation on highly-developed economies and societies.   
 By studying Japan’s dilemma – both as a subject in its own right, and as a model and 
case study for an important social phenomenon affecting highly-developed nations, 
economies and societies around the world – this work offers new perspectives on 
depopulation as a global economic and social issue, and as a phenomenon that will 
profoundly influence future global intercultural relations, politics of identity, immigration 




CHAPTER 2: LABOUR, DEMOGRAPHY AND JAPANESE SOCIETY 
 
 To provide context for Japan’s contemporary immigration policies, it is first necessary 
to assess current conditions associated with depopulation and demographic decline, as they 
apply both to the case of Japan and to highly-developed countries more generally. This 
chapter outlines the reasons why depopulation has become an important economic and social 
issue for wealthy countries at the turn of the twenty-first century, and will discuss why Japan 
has become one of the first highly-developed countries to face the more severe consequences 
of demographic decline. This chapter will also discuss the current state of immigration 
debates in Japan, outlining the relative extents to which policymakers, the public and 
influential figures in the national discourse have opposed liberalisation of Japan’s restrictive 
immigration regime. 
 
The effects of depopulation – is labour migration a viable solution? 
 The problem of depopulation has become a major area of concern for highly-
developed countries, and figures prominently in the policymaking and economic projections 
of mature economies around the world. Studies of the demography of depopulation regard 
fertility rates as the most important factor in determining rates at which national populations 
can be expected to grow over time. These contribute to a series of complicated statistical 
interrelationships that have the potential to bring enormous demographic, political and 
economic change to many countries at a very rapid pace (Wattenberg, 2004, pp. 6-7). As 
fertility rates largely govern future population levels, both nationally and globally, it is 
significant that universal birth rate declines have already come to the attention of 
demographic analysts. Even the most fertile developing countries have collectively recorded 
marked drops in fertility rates (defined as the average number of children born to a woman 
over the course of her lifetime) during the second half of the twentieth century – from a rate 
greater than 6.1 in 1950 to just above 2.9 in 2005 (Wattenberg, 2004, pp. 5-6). With a 
replacement level fertility rate of 2.1, at which national and global populations are maintained 
at constant levels (d'Addio & d'Ercole, 2005, p. 12), it is clear that world population levels 
can be expected to consistently increase for some time to come. Nevertheless, if fertility rates 
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continue to decline in accordance with current trends, a world population peak may be 
reached within just a few decades, and in the cases of a number of highly-developed countries, 
that peak already appears to have been reached. For this reason, depopulation is an urgent 
issue for both developed and developing countries. 
 
Figure 1: Trends in total fertility rates 
 
Source: OECD, 2010a 
 
 Depopulation is attributed to a variety of causes within different social and economic 
contexts. Indeed, the specific demographic conditions associated with depopulation are the 
subject of some disagreement and debate among analysts (d'Addio & d'Ercole, 2005, p. 13). 
Population decline in highly-developed countries has been a subject of particular interest 
among scholars. These declines are generally associated with combinations of social, cultural 
and economic factors in mature economies that have resulted in women deciding to delay the 
point at which they begin to have children. The societal effects of delayed fertility compound 
across generations, as women who choose to delay having children also necessarily reduce 
the period of time in which they are physically able to do so – a scenario described as “loss of 
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reproductive potential” within society (d'Addio & d'Ercole, 2005, p. 13). The inevitable result 
is an upward trend in the average age of society as a whole. The economic and social 
problems created by fertility decline are further exacerbated by increasing life expectancies, 
contributing to overall increases in average population age. This is the origin of rapidly-
ageing and ‘hyper-aged’ societies, the companion problem typically associated with low 
fertility rates.  
Other explanations for depopulation include the advent of effective contraception, 
widespread population movements in many countries from rural to urban areas together with 
corresponding changes in lifestyle, and relative improvements in employment equality and 
opportunity for women – all of which are again linked directly or indirectly with the tendency 
among young women to put off having children to a later age than was the case in the past 
(Wattenberg, 2004, p. 212). Many of these basic problems impact upon the developing world 
as well, with the global spread of medical knowledge and declining birth rates around the 
world contributing to a universal growth in elderly populations – perhaps at an even more 
rapid rate of change than that currently seen in developed countries (The World Bank, 1994, 
pp. 1-2). 
 The scale of the depopulation problem faced by highly-developed countries at present 
is enormous, particularly in economic terms. 2  As Teitelbaum and Winter (1985) argue, 
fundamental changes in the age-related demographic make-up of society are “of significance 
for virtually all aspects of public policy” (pp. 105-106). Economically speaking, the problem 
is so unprecedented, and the actual implications so difficult to predict, that analysts believe it 
to be “unlikely that nations facing fewer births, fewer customers, and an ageing problem will 
show substantial economic growth rates [in the future]” (Wattenberg, 2004, p. 213). As an 
immediate response, governments have typically offered financial incentives to increase 
fertility rates and encourage larger families by way of welfare payments, tax credits for 
parents and revisions to national paid parental leave provisions (Wattenberg, 2004, p. 212). 
The fundamental weakness of government attempts to promote greater fertility is that, even if 
these initiatives were to succeed, the benefits of that success would not begin to be seen for a 
minimum of fifteen years as children gradually reached working age, and would require 
                                                          
2
 Wattenberg (2004) broadly defines these countries as a group that enjoys “relative affluence, democratic 
governance in many forms, and general modernity” (p. 20). 
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change over the course of entire generations before any meaningful adjustment in the ratio of 
workers to elderly became evident (Bermingham, 2001, p. 359).3 
 In light of the limited options available to states hoping to actively alleviate 
depopulation, the incentives for highly-developed countries to consider immigration policy 
reform as part of a strategy to secure future economic output have become a subject of 
renewed debate. Immigration liberalisation has some degree of modern precedent, as seen 
particularly in European countries over the thirty-year ‘long boom’ period following the 
conclusion of the Second World War. In those countries, recruitment of temporary labourers 
from abroad was a critical step toward creating conditions where “migrant labour had become 
a structural feature of Western European labour markets. […] Abundant labour with low 
social costs was a vital factor in the long boom” (Castles, 2000, p. 7). Managed integration of 
significant numbers of working age migrants into mature labour markets might in principle 
be an effective way of relieving pressure on declining local working age populations, thereby 
revitalising economies facing stagnation due to the burden of sustaining disproportionately 
large populations of senior citizens. By revising immigration regimes in accordance with 
twenty-first century economic goals, governments of highly-developed countries could 
increase working population levels and provide immediate economic benefits by boosting 
domestic labour markets in desperate need of new workers. 
 Migrant labour can be integrated into a mature economy in several different ways, 
with varying degrees of long-term value and relative cost to the state. One option is to simply 
relax immigration regulations to allow a flow of both temporary and permanent migrants to 
enter, strengthening the workforce and boosting the labour market. Australia, Canada and the 
United States implemented policies of this type in the years following the Second World War 
(Castles & Miller, 1998, pp. 74-76). Alternatively, some form of guest worker programme 
                                                          
3
 Some observers now question whether Japan’s demographic crisis in particular has now reached a point where 
immigration reform on anything other than a temporary migration basis would be ineffective as a solution to 
depopulation and pension funding shortfalls. According to this argument, permitting migrants and their 
dependants to settle in Japan permanently would simply compound and intensify future demands on the social 
welfare system as those immigrants retire and begin to draw upon pensions and publicly-funded health services. 
Bermingham (2001) refers to immigration as “a palliative but not a solution” (p. 360) to developed nations’ 
problems with ageing populations and shortages of workers, arguing that the numbers of migrants required to 
stabilise a declining working-age population quickly reach unsustainable levels. That is to say, permanent 
immigration may help to defer population decline and pension funding crises, but is also likely to intensify the 
unfavourable economic impacts associated with those problems in the future. 
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can be employed, allowing the state to benefit from the labour of migrant workers without 
needing to account for the future costs of incorporating those migrants into society on a 
permanent basis. Guest worker programmes were introduced in the United States during and 
immediately following the Second World War in the form of the Bracero programme, and in 
Germany during the 1960s in the guise of a federally-mandated Gastarbeiter guest worker 
scheme, as well as in other countries (particularly in Europe) facing labour shortages in the 
same period. Current examples of migrant labour schemes in highly-developed economies 
(based on varied strategic economic motivations) can be seen in the seasonal migrations of 
agricultural labourers and live-in caregivers to Canada from the Philippines, Mexico and 
Caribbean countries (Reed, 2008, pp. 474-476), and in the mass movement of short-term 
contracted labourers from many countries in Asia to Persian Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (Chiswick & Hatton, 2005, pp. 77-78). 
 International experience has shown that even a carefully planned and managed flow 
of labourers into a host society can create significant cultural and political problems. 
Managed migration programmes create challenges around issues of political representation 
for migrants within liberal democratic societies, and protection of migrant rights within the 
framework of host country legal systems. As Zolberg (2000) puts it: “all types of immigrants 
– including even temporary workers – also constitute a political and cultural presence [within 
host societies]” (p. 63). Host countries face concerns of temporary migrants establishing a 
permanent presence, as occurred in Germany at the conclusion of the Gastarbeiter guest 
worker system in the mid 1970s (Castles, 2000, p. 9). Immigrant communities and networks 
in host societies have often established permanent sub-communities as a result of visa 
overstaying, family reunions and the birth of children within that sub-community. This has 
the effect of creating a distinct class of first-generation migrant residents. In the case of 
Germany, failure to adequately prepare for this eventuality led to long-term discrimination 
against migrants within the education system and mainstream labour market, perpetuating 
social disparity between native and immigrant communities and creating ethnic and class 
division in German society that has endured to the present day (Castles, 2000, p. 9). 
Integration of migrants into society can also potentially result in increased migrant political 
power and demands for greater social and political representation. State support for labour 
migration also places a moral obligation on host societies in liberal democratic countries to 
protect migrants from exploitation by employers, adding further complexity and expense to 
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the process of establishing migration schemes. Attempts by the state to deny migrants the 
rights enjoyed by native citizens merely intensify division along ethnic and socio-economic 
lines, further marginalising migrant communities within host societies. 
 In these respects, the socio-economic and political effects of labour migration are part 
of an important nexus of change and development in highly-developed countries. These 
countries must face a difficult question: Are they willing to tolerate unavoidable political 
consequences and social change associated with immigration reform in the interests of 
shoring up economic growth in the present, and of laying groundwork for sustainable 
economic growth in the future? 
 
The current demographic situation in Japan – why is depopulation such an 
urgent problem? 
 Japan’s demographic crisis must be understood as the result of an intertwined 
relationship between two important social factors: rapid expansion of Japan’s elderly 
population, and consistent decline in the national birth rate. According to Japan’s Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics Bureau, the eventual outcome of convergence 
of these two factors is projected to be a 25 percent overall decline in Japan’s total population 
(to 95.2 million people) by 2050 (Statistics Bureau Japan, 2010, p. 10). Japan’s response to 
the situation has been characterised by concern regarding the challenges these problems 
present to Japan’s social structure, culture and national identity. To fully assess the 
implications of this situation, it is first necessary to investigate the relationship between 
societal ageing and declining fertility in the specific context of Japan. 
 Dramatic growth in the number of elderly as a proportion of Japan’s population first 
came to the attention of demographic analysts during the 1980s (Coulmas, 2007, p. 4). At 
present, Japan’s population comprises only 2.6 people of working age (20-65 years) for every 
person aged over 65 years (OECD, 2009). Upward trends in the age of Japanese society are 
also linked with general increases in life expectancy, a measure by which Japan already leads 
among OECD countries at 78-79 years for men and 85 years for women (OECD/Korea 
Policy Centre, 2009). Japan represents one of the first developed societies to have reached 
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‘hyper-aged’ status, defined as a society in which more than 21 percent of people have 
reached the age of 65 years or older (Coulmas, 2007, p. 5). 
 
Figure 2: Elderly population as a proportion of total population 
 
Source: OECD, 2010a 
 
 The aging of Japan’s population is likely to have an enormous ongoing impact on the 
nation’s entire economy. Sakuragawa and Makino (2007) argue that population decline 
necessarily infers a decreasing rate of younger workers (aged 20-39 years) to older (aged 40-
65 years), thereby depressing the wage-earning potential of Japanese workers collectively. 
This contributes to Japan’s general economic underperformance, and creates economic 
conditions that discourage young Japanese from marrying and having children early, further 
exacerbating problems of low fertility and population decline (p. 59). According to 
Sakuragawa and Makino, the negative effect of the present aging workforce trend on growth 
in Japanese per capita consumption by 2050 will be somewhat greater than 15 percent (p. 70). 
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 The ability of the state to provide adequate pensions for future retirees has become a 
source of general concern, given the dramatic boom in numbers of elderly in Japanese society. 
Many are becoming aware of the huge projected future tax burdens on working-age Japanese 
necessary to provide adequate pension benefits to a steadily growing elderly population. 
Japan already suffers from the second-lowest pension replacement rate in the OECD, with 
new labour market entrants in the ‘average earner’ category projected to receive pensions of 
just 34 percent of their working salaries; Japan’s old-age dependency ratio, defined by the 
number of those aged 65 years or older divided by the ‘working age’ population (aged 20-64 
years), has now reached approximately 35 percent (OECD, 2009).  
 




Adapted from: OECD, 2009 
 
 Pension funding shortfalls are becoming a source of intergenerational tension between 
retirees and younger Japanese workers. The perception among younger workers is that 
mandatory contributions made to Japan’s public pension system today cannot be relied upon 
to secure their own future income when they reach retirement age. This impression is 
compounded by a widely-held view that current retirees (and those soon to retire) are being 
provided with unsustainably generous pension payments (Coulmas, 2007, pp. 13-14). Indeed, 
Japan’s public pension system is already coming under a great deal of strain, being now 
almost entirely dependent on taxpayer-subsidised ‘pay-as-you-go’ financing to meet its fiscal 
obligations. With the effect of consumer price index rises and inflation on the real value of 
pension payments, together with a growing number of elderly receiving benefits for longer 
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periods on average, Japan’s pension system is likely to make constantly increasing demands 
on a dwindling number of taxpayers in the future. Long life expectancies, high old-age 
dependency ratios and low pension replacement rates pose serious challenges to the ongoing 
viability of Japan’s entire social security structure. 
 Another important factor in the development of Japan’s demographic crisis has been 
the complicated series of economic and social problems created by significant declines in the 
national birth rate. The fertility rate in Japan at present is slightly greater than 1.0, 
significantly below the required rate of 2.1 for overall population replacement (OECD/Korea 
Policy Centre, 2009). National decline in fertility rates is an important development in the 
larger context of social change in Japan, reflecting acceptance of more inclusive roles for 
women in the workforce, a general trend toward later marriage among young Japanese people, 
and an uncertain economic outlook in which many are choosing to delay or forgo having 
children for financial or career-related reasons. 
 Changing perceptions of the roles of women have been at the forefront of Japan’s 
economic and social development in the twenty-first century. Despite a relative lack of career 
opportunity when compared with other industrialised nations, participation of women in the 
Japanese workforce as a percentage has grown over time; it is now directly comparable with 
other highly-developed economies (Coulmas, 2007, pp. 50-51). However, despite forming an 
indispensible component of Japan’s modern workforce, women still disproportionately bear 
the traditional social burden of caring for elderly relatives – a situation popularly known in 
Japan as kaigo jigoku or ‘nursing hell’ (Coulmas, 2007, p. 62). The integration of career-
oriented women into the Japanese economy – together with law changes facilitating greater 
gender equality in employment - have produced major downstream effects on fertility, as 
women apparently now collectively tend to prioritise employment or career development 
over early marriage and childbearing. That change is reflected in mean ages at first childbirth 
for Japanese women, which reached 29.7 years by 2009, in comparison with 27.0 years in 
1990 and 26.4 years in 1980 (Statistics Bureau Japan, 2010, p. 15). The mean age of first 
childbirth in Japan now exceeds that of many other OECD countries (d'Addio & d'Ercole, 
2005, p. 13).  
 Increasing mean ages at first childbirth further suppress the national birth rate by 
reducing the number of fertile years an average woman can expect after her first childbirth. 
21 
 
At the same time, social expectations obligate Japanese women to combine care for elderly 
relatives for extended periods of time with work commitments. The impact of these 
expectations places a great deal of pressure on Japanese women as a social group, and 
contributes to falling birth rates. Significant declines in fertility come at a time when Japan is 
experiencing massive growth in numbers of retirees and increasing life expectancies. This 
convergence greatly exacerbates the rapidity and severity of demographic decline and 
societal ageing in Japan. 
 Changing societal and economic demands on women have brought about 
corresponding changes in Japanese family structures. Policymakers are now confronted not 
just with the direct measurable economic effects of population decline, but also by new social 
disparities arising from the broader economic consequences of falling birth rates and 
emergence of a ‘hyper-aged’ society. The advent of a family model in which both married 
partners work, having delayed marriage and childbearing longer than was traditionally the 
case in Japanese society, has resulted in a social phenomenon known as kakusa shakai, or the 
‘gap society’ (Coulmas, 2007, p. 14). This expression refers to social inequality and conflict 
over social redistribution that surrounds the issue of unequal fertility rates currently observed 
in Japan regionally. Families that choose to delay having children for financial or 
employment-related reasons are likely to present a massive future burden to the Japanese 
public pension and welfare system, as Japan comes to rely on family-orientated care and 
support to offset burgeoning expenditure on social services for the elderly (Ogawa & 
Retherford, 1997, p. 70). Declines in fertility rates are more evident in urban than in rural 
areas, necessitating disproportionate public expenditures in favour of those living in cities. 
Further, a clear class distinction between fully-employed and part-time or freelance workers 
has appeared in Japanese society as a consequence of economic recession and a climate of 
declining employment opportunity and job security (Coulmas, 2007, pp. 14-15). In these 
ways, the follow-on effects of Japan’s demographic problems are beginning to affect other 
traditional foundations of Japanese society. 
 As discussed above, fundamental problems lie at the core of concurrent working-age 
population decline and increasing demand for pensions and social services. Greater numbers 
of elderly Japanese will come to depend on a pool of public funds that is to be provided by 
fewer workers nationwide, and expect to do so for periods of time beyond those with which 
the social security system was originally intended to cope. Policymakers are faced with a 
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dilemma; in attempts to keep expenditure on social services at a sustainable level, the 
government has aimed to minimise social security obligations to the elderly by promoting a 
return to traditional models of co-residence of elderly parents with their adult children 
(Ogawa & Retherford, 1997, p. 76), while encouraging young Japanese to start families 
earlier and to have more children (d'Addio & d'Ercole, 2005, p. 47). In the latter case, the 
government has instituted incentive programmes and increases in childcare benefits for low- 
to moderate-income families since the 1990s, though the high costs of childcare for working 
parents in urban areas frequently negate the real financial incentive behind these initiatives. 
The government has further sought to account for this in part by way of more extensive 
changes to mandatory parental leave entitlements (Ogawa, Retherford, & Matsukura, 2009, 
pp. 63-66).  
 These social and economic conditions have led influential voices in politics and 
commerce in Japan, such as the Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), to begin 
calling for reform of Japan’s immigration laws, arguing in favour of introducing from abroad 
new working-age contributors to Japan’s workforce and tax base. Many of Japan’s primary 
industries and their political advocates support massive increases in migrant numbers to 
decisively alleviate labour shortages and negative economic effects of depopulation (Nippon 
Keidanren, 2004). However, in spite of this emerging business discourse in favour of a more 
youthful and multicultural future for Japanese society, policymakers still refuse to reform 
immigration regulations that heavily restrict the legitimate use of migrant labour in Japan. As 
Japan’s labour market problems and demographic situation become critical, policymakers 
seem as unwilling as ever to contemplate opening Japan’s borders to benefit from 
transnational flows of migrant labour. 
 
Japan’s reluctance to accept foreigners – an overview 
 Considering the gravity of Japan’s demographic problems, policymakers and officials 
have shown remarkable reluctance to even consider immigration reform as a way of 
alleviating the negative effects of depopulation on Japan’s economy and society. 
Nevertheless, concepts of immigration as a prospective solution to Japan’s demographic 
crisis have become firmly established in public debate and in popular consciousness. Outright 
resistance to immigration reform is seen within many of Japan’s conservative bureaucratic 
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institutions, and represents an important policy platform of right-wing and nationalist 
political organisations in Japan, whose opinions carry significant weight in the nation’s 
political discourse. Due in part to this conflict, successive governments have displayed little 
interest or enthusiasm for the task of immigration reform. 
 Japan has experimented with labour migration to a limited extent in the past by 
attracting specific migrants to Japan based on ethnic qualifications, though the economic 
conditions that led to that experiment were quite different to those of the current demographic 
crisis. Beginning in the mid 1980s, a wave of migrants began to enter Japan as part of an 
initiative by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s administration to rejuvenate the Japanese 
labour market in the midst of booming industrial expansion and economic growth. The 
constituents of this influx were Nikkeijin – migrants of Japanese ethnic descent from Latin 
American countries, for whom labour laws were modified in 1990 in order to encourage a 
wave of ‘return’ labour migration (Coulmas, 2007, pp. 116-117). It was thought by Japan’s 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare that migrants with Japanese ethnic heritage would be 
more compatible with Japan’s social and cultural structures, though many of these migrants 
spoke no Japanese and had little in common with local communities beyond their own 
ancestry (Shipper, 2008, p. 38). Efforts were also made to encourage international students to 
undertake study in Japan, resulting in a dramatic upswing in numbers of foreign students 
living in Japan by the late 1980s (Coulmas, 2007, p. 116). However, these limited migration 
initiatives were not accompanied by further reform of Japan’s immigration policies. By 
aiming to restrict immigration opportunities to very specific groups of migrants (specifically 
those with highly specialised trade or academic backgrounds, or those with Japanese ethnic 
roots), immigration regulations at that time effectively continued Japan’s long-established 
social policies of isolation and exclusion of foreign nationals. 
 Since the 1980s, immigration regulations have become a prominent topic of debate in 
the public sphere and popular media in Japan, where the implications of immigration reform 
have been most openly discussed. According to a public survey conducted by the Asahi 
Shimbun newspaper in 2001, a majority of respondents agreed that Japan should consider 
accepting unskilled labour immigration on a conditional basis, with notably higher levels of 
support registered among younger respondents – more than 70 percent of those polled 
between the ages of 20 years and 50 years supported increased numbers of unskilled labour 
migrants to Japan, whereas support among those older than 60 years barely reached 50 
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percent (Ohno, 2001). However, lingering public scepticism reflected uncertainty over 
anticipated negative effects of an influx of foreigners into Japanese society; the survey 
revealed fears that “allowing foreign workers in will lead to a deterioration in Japanese 
working conditions and stir up trouble within the community at large” (Ohno, 2001), though 
a total of 64 percent of respondents nevertheless supported local and national governments 
providing comprehensive social services for migrant workers. Significantly, more than 60 
percent also responded positively to the idea of instituting voting rights for long-term foreign 
residents in Japan – a change that would bring a radical departure from previous foreign 
residency policies. 
  However, since 2001, enthusiasm for migrant workers in Japan appears to have 
declined, perhaps as a result of enduring recession and increasing unemployment. A series of 
public opinion polls conducted by Japan’s Cabinet Office found that overall opposition to 
migrant workers entering Japan had grown from 49.2 percent in 2000 to 70.7 percent in 2004 
(Shipper, 2008, p. 180). This conclusion was supported by another Asahi Shimbun poll 
conducted in June 2010. By surveying attitudes to immigration as a means of “maintaining 
economic vitality”, the Asahi poll found that 65 percent of respondents now opposed labour 
migration, with only 26 percent in support (Harlan, 2010). In spite of recent public scepticism, 
calls for immigration reform have multiplied, as noted in the national Daily Yomiuri 
newspaper (Sakanaka, 2010). Commentators have persisted in calling for bold reform of 
immigration regulations, arguing that “the only long-term solution for alleviating the nation’s 
population crisis is a government policy of accepting immigrants” (Sakanaka, 2010). Overall, 
while debate over Japan’s demographic problems has gained greater attention and urgency, 
concepts of labour migration as a feasible response to the demographic crisis have fluctuated 
in terms of public support. Nevertheless, the essence of immigration debate has evolved over 
time from a discussion of whether migrant individuals and communities have any role to play 
in Japanese society at all, to one focusing on whether migrants could be a viable source of 
labour on which Japan’s labour market might depend in the future (Coulmas, 2007, p. 119). 
 Japanese business lobby groups and associations have largely promoted the view that 
immigration reform is acceptable and economically inevitable. For instance, the Nippon 
Keidanren publicly supports labour migration on economic grounds, stating that migration 
was necessary to bring “the dynamism of diversity into Japan from outside” and criticising 
the fact that “accepting non-Japanese workers into the country is not yet being considered as 
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a viable option for filling this gap” (Nippon Keidanren, 2004). Seemingly regardless of 
pressures from industry and the public, Japan’s national government has shown considerable 
reluctance to acknowledge these views. Little substantive change has been evident in 
government policy surrounding the subject since the Immigration Control Law (revised in 
1982 as the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act) took effect in October 1951 
(Taberner, 2008). Attempts have certainly been made by some prominent public figures to 
bring the matter of immigration reform to the attention of policymakers. A group of Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) lawmakers led by former party Secretary General Hidenao 
Nakagawa announced a proposal in 2008 for Japan to accept ten million labour migrants by 
the year 2050, allowing both workers and their families to reside permanently in Japan and 
mandating the creation of a centralised immigration regulatory body – these represented 
unprecedented steps toward reform. However, this proposal was not implemented before the 
LDP’s defeat in the 2009 general election. As a result, LDP lawmakers were subjected to 
criticism over the confused state of Japan’s immigration priorities, in light of a series of 
immigration crackdowns over the previous decade targeting young families that had in many 
cases successfully integrated into Japanese society. The LDP faced accusations that Japan 
was in the process of permanently deporting the same groups of people that Nakagawa 
proposed to attract as part of the reform proposal (Clark, 2009). 
The rise to power of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the 2009 general election 
after more than fifty years of LDP rule renewed hope for progressive development in migrant 
employment regulations and greater openness to foreigners in the Japanese labour market. 
During the election campaign, the central DPJ social policy platform essentially matched 
conservative LDP-era policies of more extensive taxpayer-funded childcare subsidy 
programmes for prospective parents (Kelly, 2009). However, in June 2010 Prime Minister 
Naoto Kan’s government announced a new series of immigration reform proposals intended 
to attract migrants, with a goal of doubling the number of highly-skilled migrant workers in 
Japan by the year 2020 (Harlan, 2010). This proposal met with criticism for operating in 
conjunction with revisions to immigration and residency laws (to take effect in 2012) that 
consolidate Japan’s locally-administered alien registration card system into a single national 
database overseen by Japan’s Ministry of Justice, engendering fears of future system-wide 
clampdowns on foreign residency in Japan and further isolation and marginalisation of 
resident foreign communities (Eubank, 2010). As these examples illustrate, forward-looking 
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official attempts to reform Japan’s immigration policies have been accompanied by legal 
provisions intended to restrict social integration of migrants. Equally, reform attempts of the 
past have revealed deep misgivings among policymakers regarding the social consequences 
of allowing greater numbers of foreign workers into Japan on a permanent basis. Overall, 
these mixed messages have created uncertainty over the seriousness with which political 
actors in Japan regard immigration reform and demographic problems. 
 The approach of Japan’s bureaucratic agencies (such as the Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Police Agency, among others) to this issue has been 
to consistently and deliberately conflate foreign communities and individuals with images of 
crime in Japanese society. Many observers have noted a tendency of these agencies to 
publicise foreign crime statistics out of their demographic and social contexts in order to 
promote an impression of migrants as threats to society. Shipper (2008) points to analysis of 
National Police Agency crime statistics from the period 1993-2005 that suggest that while the 
overall number of criminal offenses committed by foreigners in Japan increased over that 
period, many offenses could be attributed to breaches of immigration and alien registration 
regulations (which are not applicable to Japanese nationals), and that official statistical 
analyses failed to acknowledge the multiple offences that necessarily result from overstaying 
or incorrect registration in the alien registration system (pp. 160-161).  
 Prominent political figures have persisted in characterising foreign residents of Japan 
as criminals – a well-known example being the incumbent Governor of Tokyo Shintaro 
Ishihara, noted for publicly referring to immigrant communities using the derogatory term 
sankokujin (literally ‘third-country persons’, in the sense that they belong neither in Japan nor 
in their native countries), and for suggesting that foreign residents in Japan could be expected 
to riot in the event of a major earthquake (Larimer, 2000). Similarly, LDP faction leader, 
former Construction Minister and former Director-General of the Management and 
Coordination Agency Takami Eto publicly stated in 2003 that “in [this] country, there are one 
million illegal foreigners, who are committing robbery and murder” (Shipper, 2008, p. 163). 
Data for that year indicated that foreigners of all nationalities were responsible for 145 
robberies and 16 murders, while Japanese nationals were reported to have committed 4,698 
robberies and 1,456 murders in the same period. Total numbers of illegal foreigners in Japan 
are estimated to have not exceeded 300,000 at any given time, in contrast to Eto’s claims 
(Shipper, 2008, pp. 159, 163). The promotion of negative migrant stereotypes by public 
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servants and politicians in public debate has a powerful effect in moving immigration policy 
in a conservative direction, deterring progressive lawmakers from pressing more insistently 
for the kind of liberal reform seen in the Nakagawa and Kan immigration proposals. 
 Outside government circles, other conservative contributors to Japan’s political 
discourse openly express objections to liberalising Japan’s immigration regulations and 
support bureaucratic resistance to immigration reform proposals. Nationalist and conservative 
groups in Japan endorse arguments that foreign residents are responsible for many social 
problems, and that migrants represent a threat to Japan’s social harmony and stability. 
Opposition to immigration and foreign residence in Japan originates both from long-
established ultranationalist political groups known in Japanese as uyoku dantai, and from a 
recent wave of right-wing movements (known as the ‘Net right’) organised around internet-
based social networking sites (Fackler, 2010). The views of some of these groups have 
enjoyed considerable support within the Diet, as nationalist political organisations exert 
considerable influence over Japan’s policymaking processes. 4  Uyoku dantai groups also 
wield power over lawmakers using intimidation and pressure tactics, making both veiled and 
overt threats to those they perceive as too progressive on issues of national identity and 
culture (Shibuichi, 2007). The correlation between nationalist ideology and legislative power 
has entrenched blocs of opposition to immigration reform within Japan’s governing 
institutions that obstruct the government from moving toward substantial immigration reform. 
Though nationalist groups vary in the specifics of their views regarding Japan’s engagement 
with other countries and resident migrant communities, they typically share a broad anti-
immigration position – for example, ‘Net right’ groups such as the Zaitokukai (an 
abbreviation of ‘Citizens Group That Will Not Forgive Special Privileges For Koreans In 
Japan’) campaign against the rights of long-term immigrant communities in Japan (Fackler, 
2010). These groups promote a highly-visible counter-position to pro-immigration voices in 
public debate, and provide ostensible popular legitimacy to those in government and the 
bureaucracy who oppose immigration reform on racially-motivated or nationalistic grounds. 
                                                          
4
 Recognising the extent of conservative political power in Japan, Szymkowiak and Steinhoff (1995) depict the 
origins of modern right-wing ideology on contemporary mainstream Japanese politics as “a subsurface alliance 
[that] developed between radical right and centre-right coalition in power [immediately after the Second World 
War], which later coalesced into the Liberal Democratic Party” (p. 269). 
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 In summary, immigration reform and the integration of migrants into Japanese society 
is a controversial topic in Japan’s public discourse. While proponents of immigration reform 
enjoy qualified moral support from mainstream society, powerful interest groups in Japan’s 
government, legislature and civil society oppose real reform and favour a policy of 
maintaining status-quo in immigration policy, regardless of whether or not that policy may be 





















CHAPTER 3: CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR JAPAN’S 
RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT FOREIGNERS 
 
 Japan’s immigration policies have received considerable attention from scholars and 
media, as the scale of the depopulation problem in Japan has become more widely recognised. 
Discussions of the subject purport to identify specific core reasons that explain the origins of 
current Japanese policy in simple terms. These typically revolve around issues of race, 
intolerance, xenophobia, cultural ‘uniqueness’, and assumptions of monoethnic and 
monocultural social structures in contemporary Japan. In contrast, my explanation for Japan’s 
immigration policies locates Japan’s cultural milieu, traditions and governing ideology within 
a wider context of worldwide development and globalisation. The purpose of this chapter is 
to outline the bases of conventional arguments for Japan’s reluctance to liberalise 
immigration regulations, and to demonstrate that these are not sufficient explanations for the 
motivations behind Japan’s ongoing cultural isolationism. Most importantly, this chapter is 
intended to differentiate between conventional inwardly-focused Japan-centric explanations 
for reluctance to accept migrants, and a broader, more contextual globalised explanation for 
Japan’s immigration policies, for which I make the case in Chapter Four.  
    
Outline of literature on the subject of the foreign experience in Japan 
 Japan’s reluctance to accept large-scale migration of foreigners into Japan - and 
restriction of migrants living in Japan - has already attracted a great deal of academic and 
popular attention. Much literature has aimed to analyse implications and predict outcomes of 
Japan’s demographic problems. Indeed, since the reopening of Japan to foreign trade and 
political influence during the Tokugawa era, both foreign and Japanese observers have taken 
interest in Japan’s relationship with the wider world. Contradictions that inform Japan’s 
foreign relations are a part of the perennial attraction of Japan as a subject for political and 
social analysis. Investigation of Japan’s demographic crisis continues in that tradition, 
focusing on an apparent policy struggle between responding to a demographic crisis that 
threatens the future prosperity and economic viability of Japan, and a seemingly compulsive 
desire to keep the world at arm’s length, even though the labour contributions of migrants 
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may prove essential in keeping Japan’s economy afloat. In short, modern Japan poses a 
fascinating theoretical conundrum for academic analysts and popular commentators alike. A 
body of literature forms the basic framework used as a reference to define Japan’s primary 
social policy problem of the twenty-first century – that is, the response to demographic 
change and population decline. 
 A tradition of foreign discussion of Japan’s culture and customs was established 
during the Meiji era, with writers such as Lafcadio Hearn in Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan 
(1894) and Basil Hall Chamberlain in Things Japanese (1890) providing early detailed 
insight into the structure and functions of Japanese society and the reception of foreigners in 
Japan’s social order. In the twentieth century, a landmark work dealing with Japan’s social 
relations was Ruth Benedict’s The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946). Though produced 
without the benefit of firsthand experience of research in Japan or access to many primary 
resources (pp. 5-8), Benedict’s attempts to understand the motivations behind Japanese 
behaviour and customs set a precedent for postwar anthropological study of Japan. The 
groundbreaking aspect of Benedict’s work was identification of Japan’s social patterns, 
allowing readers an insight into the workings of Japanese society and culture. Analyses of 
this type multiplied with the later emergence of interest in Japan’s corporate business models, 
with many researchers and authors such as Richard T. Pascale and Anthony G. Athos in The 
Art of Japanese Management (1981) and Ezra F. Vogel in Japan as Number One (1979) 
aiming to identify the paradigms of social organisation, bureaucratic governance and 
corporate structure that allowed for Japan’s ‘economic miracle’ in the 1970s and 1980s. 
  Contemporary works have aimed to re-examine Japan’s customs and culture in a 
twenty-first century context. A common purpose of these efforts has been to identify 
particular features of the Japanese outlook that explain the negative reception of migrants in 
Japanese society – or as Kerr (2001) puts it, the tendency for foreigners to be “kept at arm’s 
length” (p. 351). This contrast poses a particularly interesting puzzle for foreign observers, as 
Japan is also internationally famous for a culture of hospitality, leaving many short-term 
visitors to Japan with very positive impressions of Japanese society. One common conclusion 
is that institutionalised racist beliefs and assumptions of cultural superiority explain Japan’s 
unwillingness to accept migrants, and desire to keep foreign influence out of domestic 
politics and society; this position is argued by Reischauer (1988) and Shipper (2008), among 
others. Another important interpretation – as argued by Young (1983), Buckley (1990) and 
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others - revolves around belief in the nature of Japan as a ‘homogenous society’; that is, the 
idea that Japan is uniquely constructed in political and social terms from a monoethnic 
foundation based on kinship and ‘unique’ thought patterns determined by nuances of 
Japanese language, culture and expression. Scholars such as Van Wolferen (1989), Lie (2001) 
and Chung (2010) have argued against the existence of such a social model in Japan, and 
much debate continues around theories of ‘social homogeneity’. In order to understand some 
of the weaknesses and inadequacies of conventional interpretations of demographic change 
and immigration reform in contemporary Japan, it is necessary to look at these two essential 
schools of thought in more detail. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the ways in which 
assertions of ‘social homogeneity’ compare and contrast with more straightforward concepts 
of racial and cultural intolerance. 
 
The xenophobia/racism explanation 
 The most commonly cited explanations for why Japan so thoroughly restricts 
opportunities for migrants are based on arguments of racism, xenophobia, institutionalised 
discrimination and assumptions of cultural superiority in Japanese culture. This interpretation 
acknowledges the surface appearance of the immigration debate in Japan; that is to say, 
Japan’s unwillingness to engage with migrants socially or politically suggests straightforward 
intolerance or disdain for foreign people, cultures and customs. Some scholars note that this 
reaction perhaps reflects the general scarcity of opportunities for Japanese people outside the 
major cities to interact with foreign residents; as Reischauer (1988) points out, “Most 
Japanese go for years or even their whole lives without having any significant contact with a 
foreigner” (p. 390). Further, minimal levels of interpersonal contact or intercultural 
understanding contribute to widespread disinterest in engaging with foreigners (p. 392). 
Advocates of the racism argument cite this state of affairs as evidence in itself for why Japan 
refuses to accept migrants. 
 The racism argument emphasises many aspects of Japanese social life that imply 
disapproval or discrimination against foreigners. A particular subject of interest is the way in 
which foreign ethnicity and cultural identity is dealt with by Japanese citizenship and 
residency regulations. One commonly-noted example is the Japanese local government alien 
registration card system that requires non-citizens to carry an identity card bearing the 
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holder’s image, name, date of birth, home address, place of employment and other personal 
information whenever out in public. Foreign residents of Japan face arrest or fines if this 
document cannot be produced when requested by police. Proponents of the racism argument 
highlight incidents of harassment and alleged ethnic profiling on the part of Japanese police, 
where residents of ‘non-Japanese’ appearance frequently undergo intrusive questioning or 
searches by police (Arudou, 2010b). Other references to discrimination include the status of 
long-term multigenerational residents of Japan, especially those of Korean or Chinese ethnic 
descent, who must openly renounce their native cultural ties and identity in order to be 
recognised as Japanese citizens. These examples are intended to draw attention to rigid 
distinctions in Japanese laws and society between ‘foreign’ and ‘native’ in definitions of 
citizenship and ethnicity. Official tolerance of ‘no foreigner’ policies and signs in places of 
business are presented as evidence of the entrenchment of xenophobic attitudes in Japanese 
society - for example, in relation to ethnically-exclusive golf club memberships (Clark, 2009), 
and to discrimination in housing and apartment rentals (Arudou, 2010b). 
 Commentators on the subject of discrimination against foreigners in Japanese society 
frequently refer to the concept and history of dejima (literally ‘an outside island’) to articulate 
the attitude of government agencies to the presence of foreign communities in Japan, and to 
characterise the relationship between foreigners and mainstream society. The dejima 
reference can be traced to the early years of officially-sanctioned trading between Japanese 
subjects and foreign merchants in Nagasaki, where business transactions were geographically 
restricted to a single island within the harbour basin. The purpose of this outpost was to 
insulate subjects on the mainland from foreign influence, which was feared as a threat to the 
authority of the Tokugawa shogunate (Kazui & Videen, 1982). Proponents of the racism 
argument now directly link the historical policies that gave rise to a physical dejima in 
Nagasaki, and modern-day policies that metaphorically isolate Japanese society from foreign 
intrusion in a similar manner; as Douglass and Roberts (2003) put it, “the policy of 
government and the practice of society has been to pretend that immigration was not 
occurring and to require foreigners either to live in officially-designated enclaves or 
otherwise to be contained in specific neighbourhoods” (p. 11). Kerr (2001) takes this 
argument further by stating, “Modern-day rules that restrict foreigners to certain discrete 
corners of Japanese society and keep them out of the mainstream can be traced to dejima. 
And the dream of a physical dejima for foreigners has never faded. […] Many national and 
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local development plans [have] called for getting all the foreigners to move into special 
apartment buildings designed just for them – often on landfill islands” (p. 344). 
 Lie (2001) claims that “new foreign workers constituted a problem insofar as they 
posed a potential, and largely symbolic, threat to Japanese society due to their racialisation 
[…] [meaning] the process by which a group comes to be marked by its physical and cultural 
distinctiveness” (p. 18). The racism argument states that this view of migrants as a threat has 
led Japan’s policymakers to flawed conclusions regarding the cultural makeup of their own 
society. Difficulties in determining precise definitions of a difference between Japanese 
ethnicity and Japanese citizenship have resulted in policy structures that do not clearly define 
‘Japanese’ status as recognised by the government. For instance, Arudou (2010a) refers to the 
lack of an option for naturalised Japanese citizens in the 2010 Japanese national census to 
indicate ethnicity and citizenship status separately. It is argued that Japan’s social policies do 
not take multiethnic or multicultural identities into account when determining a citizen’s 
relationship with the state. Put another way, this argument states that governing structures in 
Japan are ill-equipped at present to cope with an eventuality where portions of Japan’s 
population might self-identify with multiple ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds. The 
compulsion to resist reform, it is argued, stems largely from the current social acceptability of 
excluding migrants of non-Japanese ethnic background from rights and privileges enjoyed by 
citizens. This allows the government to avoid creating institutional policy frameworks that 
take multicultural identities into account. Arudou (2010a) concludes, “Japan’s identity is 
currently based on the ideals of cultural and even racial purity. Why would one dare to collect 
official data that would undermine that?”  
 According to this argument, the inevitable outcomes of these conditions are 
immigration policies defined by preoccupation with the ethnic and cultural characteristics of 
‘non-Japanese’ residents of Japan – that is, a policy structure defined by racial intolerance. 
For instance, Befu and Manabe (1990) regard popular discussion of ethnic diversity in mass 
culture and literature as emblematic of a mainstream Japanese identity defined exclusively in 
ethnic terms. They assert that ethnicity is popularly believed to operate “as a mechanism for 
maintaining the cultural boundary between Japanese and non-Japanese” (p. 126). Shipper 
(2008) characterises Japan’s current immigration policies as based on treating foreigners 
“unpaternalistically […] and categorises them hierarchically by race (or nationality)” (p. 25), 
emphasising an institutional lack of coherent integration strategies for migrants in Japanese 
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society. Similarly, Coulmas (2007) highlights the effects of exclusionary immigration 
policies on migrants’ relations with society and the state, arguing that many “have qualms 
about their status as ‘members of the Japanese society’ […] This sentiment is shared by many, 
foreigners and Japanese alike, and forms one of the major intangible obstacles to increasing 
immigration” (p. 116). These arguments sample an overall school of thought that connects 
Japanese reluctance to accept migrants with racism, xenophobia and cultural insularity. 
Advocates of the racism argument opt to focus attention on intolerance in contemporary 
Japan, which purportedly “seems happy in its cultural isolation, and still thinks it can survive 
without a sensible immigration policy” (Clark, 2009). 
 
The ethnic/cultural homogeneity explanation 
 The second typical explanation for Japan’s reluctance to accept migrants is connected 
with perceptions of Japan’s supposedly monoethnic and monocultural society. These ideas 
are usually collectively referred to as ‘social homogeneity’. The core of this argument, as 
advocated by Reischauer (1988), Buckley (1990) and Young (1983), is that Japan is an 
isolated example of social and ethnic sameness to an extent unseen elsewhere among the 
world’s developed nations. Refusal to allow migrants into Japan on a long-term basis in 
significant numbers consequently reflects a desire to maintain Japan’s social uniformity, and 
to avoid disruption to the institutions and policies that developed to serve a homogenous 
society. Douglass and Roberts (2003), Lie (2001), Chung (2010) and others refute this 
argument on a conceptual and empirical basis, pointing to evidence that Japan is not 
monoethnic and monocultural in character. These scholars refer to significant long-term 
resident communities of non-Japanese extraction, return migrants of Japanese descent, and 
other minority groups (such as long-term resident Korean and Chinese communities) in the 
overall makeup of modern Japanese society. Debate over the concept of social homogeneity 
aids in clarifying the structure of contemporary Japanese society to some extent, but arguably 
does not provide an adequate mechanism for understanding the deeper motivations Japan’s 
unwillingness to accept immigration reform. 
 The concept of social homogeneity in Japan has served as a focal point for many 
foreign observers and scholars of social relations in Japan. Reischauer (1988) states, “the 
Japanese today are the most thoroughly unified and culturally homogenous large bloc of 
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people in the world, with the possible exception of the North Chinese” (p. 33). Young (1983) 
concurs: “Local, regional, and occupational diversity exists, but the nation is intrinsically far 
more unified that any other industrial nation” (p. 71). Based on these assumptions, 
proponents of the social homogeneity argument interpret Japanese society in terms of 
monoethnicity and monoculturalism. 
 Advocates of the social homogeneity explanation refer to Japan’s past immigration 
record, either to reaffirm the validity of anti-immigration arguments or to disavow social 
homogeneity as a deliberately constructed myth (Douglass & Roberts, 2003). Put another 
way, the centrality of the social homogeneity concept effectively frames much debate over 
immigration reform. In particular, the extent of past migration to Japan is a fervently disputed 
topic; some scholars openly assert that Japan has never undergone any period of migrant 
inflow at all. Sassen (1994) states, “Japan has never had immigration, though it has a history, 
even if at times brief, of forced labour recruitment, colonisation, and emigration. It lacks a 
belief in the positive contributions of immigration. The concept immigration did not exist in 
its law on the entry and exit of aliens” (p. 62). Others refute these assumptions, pointing to 
historical evidence of foreign influence in Japan’s arts, culture and language, and favouring 
more nuanced interpretations of Japan’s migration history. Douglass and Roberts (2003) 
emphasise the ideological underpinnings of ‘immigration denial’ and maintain that migrants 
have been important actors in the development of Japan’s society, arguing that the 
immigration debate is manipulated to entrench fears of “an assault on the racial purity of 
Japan” (p. 11). Chung (2010) argues that while Japan recognises an essential need for 
immigration reform, policymakers have shown far greater interest in punishing visa 
violations and expelling overstaying immigrants than in creating sustainable policy 
frameworks for migrant integration (p. 144). These exchanges share theories of social 
homogeneity as a conceptual hub around which debate over importance of migrants to 
Japan’s culture and society revolves. 
 A considerable volume of academic literature does refute the concept of social 
homogeneity in Japan. As Clammer (2001) argues, “Japan empirically has always been a 
diverse society, differentiated by region, dialect, local economies and cultures, [and] by 
religious pluralism” (p. 20). Similarly, Lie (2001) states: “The fundamental forces of modern 
Japanese history – state-making, colonial expansion, and capitalist industrialisation – 
engendered ethnic heterogeneity. To speak of modern Japan is to speak of multiethnic Japan” 
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(p. 83). These scholars argue that Japan’s long history of regional individuality disproves the 
social homogeneity argument. Instead, it is argued that Japan’s outward appearance of 
uniformity and social sameness is a consequence of cultural and political pressure that pushes 
examples of diversity to the margins of society. Elaborating on this point, Kerr (2001) refers 
to Japan’s monocultural ethos as a psychological construction: “[This ethos] is in the mind. 
It’s the emotional consequence of Japan’s rigid systems, which bind individuals and keep out 
the fresh air of new ideas from abroad” (p. 354). 
 Conventional analyses of Japan’s reluctance to accept migrants are limited in the 
extent to which they explain the reasons behind Japan’s current reluctance to accept 
foreigners, concentrating instead on surface characteristics of the immigration debate and 
social attitudes toward migrants. The purpose of the chapter that follows is to reinterpret 
these arguments in a new context, with a specific focus on explaining on a structural level 
why Japan persists with exclusionary social and political policies in the face of demographic 
change. My argument is based in some instances on alternative interpretations of evidence 
used to support the conventional opinions described above. However, conventional 
arguments tend to overemphasise one side or other of the social divide between migrants and 
mainstream Japan. The racism argument implicitly takes the side of foreign residents of Japan, 
focusing on denials of fair representation, basic human rights and the marginalisation of 
migrants based primarily on qualifications of race or identity. Conversely, the social 
homogeneity argument highlights supposed cultural requirements for recognition within 
Japan’s social structure, concentrating on an implied incompatibility of migrants with 
Japanese society as a unified entity; that is to say, proponents of this argument are 
preoccupied by whether there is ‘room’ for migrants in Japanese society, as a response to the 
question of why Japan’s policymakers reject appeals for immigration reform. In reality, both 
sides of the dichotomy are relevant to the immigration debate in Japan. However, I contend 
that both arguments ultimately interpret immigration issues in Japan in terms that are too 
narrow. Though it may be true that migrants face social hostility based on racial prejudice, 
this does not fully explain why Japan is unwilling to accommodate foreigners for economic 
reasons; similarly, evaluating Japan’s history of diversity by itself does little to explain 
policymakers’ views regarding the importance of Japan’s demographic problems as measured 
against impulses to protect the status-quo in Japan’s social structures. 
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 In contrast, my analysis locates conventional models of Japanese identity within a 
wider context of globalised labour migration. By questioning policymakers’ core assumptions 
regarding immigration policy, migrant integration and the effects of migration on the 
character of Japanese society and politics, the next chapter aims to explain the reasons behind 
current policy structures that neither effectively address Japan’s looming demographic crisis, 





















CHAPTER 4: AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION: ISOLATIONISM 
AND MIGRATION 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to outline and defend an alternative explanation for 
Japan’s persistence with highly restrictive immigration policies in the face of societal ageing 
and demographic decline. Evidence for Japan’s overall outlook on migration (and 
engagement with the wider global community) can be discerned in the combination of 
historical experience, in the practical regulation of migrants in Japan’s workforce, and in 
political pressures and viewpoints that manifest in Japan’s national discourse. This chapter 
will argue that Japan’s national outlook divides world affairs into discrete ‘Japanese’ and 
‘non-Japanese’ categories; this produces a binary, ‘us-and-them’ mindset in policymaking 
that profoundly influences Japan’s interpretations of the significance of people, ideas and 
events on the world stage. This chapter will argue that, due to this mindset, Japan’s 
policymakers have failed to effectively respond to the challenges of global action. As a result, 
Japan’s immigration policies have failed to keep pace with trends in global population 
movement and transnational labour migration. Overall, in this chapter I will argue that Japan 
remains reluctant to accept migrants because of fundamental policy structures and 
assumptions – arising from a binary ‘us-and-them’ approach to world affairs - that no longer 
adequately respond to the realities of transnational population movement in the early twenty-
first century. 
 
The mindset of Japan’s policymakers: Japan vs. the global ‘other’ 
As noted in Chapter Three, conventional explanations of Japan’s ambivalent relations 
with migrants explore and reiterate arguments of Japanese institutionalised racism and 
xenophobia, cultural ‘uniqueness’ and the ethos of a homogenous society. These explanations, 
seemingly consistent with the experiences of many migrants and long-term visitors to Japan, 
ultimately fail to provide adequate frameworks with which to interpret Japan’s resistance of 
immigration reform. In order to more fully understand Japan’s reluctance to accept migrants, 
a more comprehensive analytical framework for the attitudes and motivations of Japanese 
policymakers is required. 
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 Here, I argue that institutionalised racism, xenophobia and the supposedly ‘unique’ 
makeup of Japanese society contribute to a larger binary ‘us-and-them’ mindset on the part of 
Japanese policymakers. This mindset holds Japan to be fundamentally separate from the 
global community to a degree beyond ordinary patriotism or pride in national traditions and 
values. The mindset is best summarised as a broad conception of world affairs that juxtaposes 
Japan as a nation against foreign countries, cultures and institutions collectively. As such, 
Japanese policymaking de-emphasises Japan’s role as a powerful player and participant in a 
globalised system of economic and diplomatic relations. This mindset shapes policymaking 
over a range of foreign and domestic issues, and is of central importance to debates over 
immigration reform in Japan. I will examine this mindset through discussion of three key 
subject areas: Japan’s historical relations with other nations and the international community; 
Japan’s track record of practical limitations and restrictions on migrant worker integration; 
and political factors that have shaped debate over definitions of Japanese national identity. 
Taken together, these three discussions help to clarify the origins, current effects and future 
implications of Japan’s binary approach to global relations. 
 
Japan’s historical relations with foreigners 
 Japan has had a conflicted historical relationship with the outside world. Attitudes to 
relations with the global ‘other’ have fluctuated over time between extremes of open 
engagement and complete seclusion in accordance with prevailing social and political 
conditions of respective historical periods. Many foreign observers recognise the legacy of 
these historical fluctuations in Japan’s present-day insularity and hesitancy to welcome 
people and ideas from abroad, while simultaneously embracing foreign technology and ideas 
and adapting these exclusively for use within Japan’s own social and economic setting. This 
historical pattern applies equally to the integration of migrants. Gaikokujin (foreign nationals) 
have always occupied the fringes in Japan, allowed to work only in the occupations that 
Japanese society itself has shunned. Contemporary Japanese attitudes to migrants and 
immigration are closely connected to Japan’s historical experiences. This connection is a 
central element of the reasons why policymakers and the public in general are reluctant to 
accept policy changes that could help to successfully integrate migrants into Japanese society. 
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 This section is intended to outline the influence of historical events on current 
policymaking attitudes toward migrants in Japan. By assessing the implications of Japan’s 
interactions with foreigners in modern history, it is possible to observe precedents for an 
impulse in contemporary policymaking to insulate Japan against foreign intrusion. Further, 
specific historical events provide insight into the reasons why migration is not generally 
viewed in Japan as a favourable strategy to alleviate the effects of depopulation today. 
 Legacies of historical events are evident today in policies that clearly aim to minimise 
Japan’s exposure to events, ideas and people from abroad, while also maintaining a strong 
grip over Japanese domestic economic and political affairs. A recurrent theme in Japan’s 
foreign affairs is the effort to insulate Japan against outside influence in its various forms. 
This goal often comes into conflict with Japan’s wider political and economic objectives, 
marginalising Japan within the international community and magnifying the negative 
consequences associated with failure to engage effectively with global systems. Inwardly-
focused policies have cut Japan off from effective global lines of communication, leaving the 
nation particularly vulnerable to the effects of political developments abroad. This pattern can 
be seen in the examples of colonial pressure on Japan during the nineteenth century, 
burgeoning Japanese nationalistic ideology and militarism in the early twentieth century, and 
the strategic manipulation of Japan in East Asian Cold War politics by western powers 
following the Second World War. Fluctuations in the global economic system have also 
impacted harshly upon Japan, as a result of occupying a single-minded niche in the global 
economy built upon political support for export industries above other sectors.   
 Many in Japan argue that the country remains as isolated and vulnerable to foreign 
‘interference’ as ever. Pyle (1983) identifies ‘siege psychology’ as a motivating factor behind 
Japan’s reluctance to engage with the global community, arguing that global economic 
relations have been “the most frequent source of this psychology as Japan has been besieged 
by western industrial nations demanding that it restrain its exports, sign orderly marketing 
agreements, reduce its current account surplus, open its market, and accelerate its imports” (p. 
297). Along similar lines, Van Wolferen (1989) states, “it has become common for officials 
and prominent commentators to suggest that their country has fallen victim to widespread 
international ill-will, and they are apt to dismiss unfavourable analyses as ‘Japan-bashing’” (p. 
1). Further, former Japanese colonial territories vociferously demand that Japan accept 
greater responsibility for wartime atrocities and offer apologies and compensation to victims 
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of Japan’s wartime ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’. China and South Korea’s 
growing economic power status has emboldened those countries to forcefully demand 
revision of Japanese domestic policies relating to diplomacy, education and interpretation of 
Japan’s Peace Constitution. Indefinite dependence on the United States for security - 
resulting from Article 9 of the Peace Constitution - has only served to heighten frustrations 
over foreign influence, adding weight to fears of foreign threats to Japan’s national interests 
and sovereignty. 
 As will be seen in the examples that follow, the influence of foreign communities and 
powers over Japanese affairs has contributed to a highly-insular outlook on the part of 
Japan’s contemporary class of policymakers. Discussion of each of these will contribute to an 
overall understanding of why Japan maintains a restrictive immigration regime today. 
 For much of the Tokugawa era, foreigners were completely excluded by decree from 
Japanese society and territory. Japanese subjects were similarly forbidden from leaving the 
country or from coming into contact with foreigners – these measures, enacted in the 1630s, 
were referred to as sakoku (‘closed country’). At its height, this policy totally proscribed 
interactions between Japanese subjects and foreigners, with the single exception of an 
isolated trading post in Nagasaki (Dejima) created as a point of contact with Chinese 
merchants and representatives of the Dutch East India Company. The policy reflected fears of 
European imperial expansion in East Asia in reaction to the influence of Portuguese and 
Dutch Christian missionaries, who were seen as a source of competition to the authority and 
power of the Tokugawa shogunate; in 1639 the shogunate decided to specifically exclude 
Portuguese trading ships from Japan due to concerns regarding the “insidious Christian cargo 
that they bore” (Kazui & Videen, 1982, p. 292).5 
 The crucial historical point of change was the arrival of an American fleet of warships 
commanded by Commodore Matthew C. Perry in Japanese coastal waters in 1853. The threat 
of a forced opening to trade marked the end of national seclusion and the beginning of an era 
                                                          
5
 Sakoku also reflected a long tradition of military and cultural antagonism between Japan and other Asian 
countries. The reunification of Japan under the Tokugawa shogunate had itself taken place in the wake of a 
series of destructive military expeditions against Korea launched by Hideyoshi Toyotomi during the 1590s. 
Perpetual political anxiety about Japan’s strategic vulnerability as an island territory dates back to the Heian era 
and beyond, and is noted in Japan’s traditions, mythology and interpretation of ancient historical events – 
perhaps the best-known example being the original kamikaze (‘divine wind’), a semi-mythical storm that 
destroyed Mongol invasion fleets threatening Japan in 1281. 
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that would bring enormous development to Japan’s politics, economy and society. Faced with 
the possibility of military conflict with western powers over access to Japan’s markets, Japan 
entered into the Kanagawa Treaty with the United States in March 1854. The treaty allowed 
for the opening of Japanese ports to American trading ships, among other concessions; this 
expanded further under the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in July 1858. Forced engagement 
of the Tokugawa shogunate with western powers and the unfavourable terms of these trade 
agreements contributed to political tensions with daimyo (regional lords) and the Japanese 
imperial court that ultimately led to the fall of the shogunate and the advent of the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868 (Perez, 1998, pp. 86-91). Following the restoration of imperial rule, 
Japan embarked on a process of open engagement with foreign ideas and technological 
development that eventually permitted Japan to become a preeminent industrial and military 
player in world affairs by the turn of the twentieth century. 
 Fundamental reforms of the newly-created national government of the early Meiji era, 
such as the Charter Oath of April 1868, demonstrated a massive shift in outlook from 
previous eras regarding the influence of foreigners in Japan. For the first time in the modern 
age, foreigners were welcomed as a source of information and technical knowledge to be 
utilised in securing Japan’s independence from colonial powers and in pursuing the goal of 
rapid modernisation (Perez, 1998, p. 94). Emblematic of the era was the concept of wakon 
yosai (‘Japanese spirit with western knowledge’) – the idea that modern developments in 
technology, economics and politics could be imported and utilised in a way that maintained 
unique Japanese perspectives and cultural norms (Sawamura, 2002, p. 343). To this end, 
foreign experts in engineering, agriculture and industry were employed by the national 
government as oyatoi gaikokujin (‘hired foreigners’) to aid in Japan’s development of modern 
skills and knowledge. A period of changed perspective regarding the desirability of foreign 
(and specifically ‘western’) influence in Japanese society and political affairs – the so-called 
kaikoku (‘open country’) period – also served as an important historical precedent for modern 
political development, as Japanese policymakers opted to embrace foreign influence as a 
strategic step toward bolstering Japan’s power in the region. Nevertheless, distrust of 
foreigners remained; even the most eminent of foreign experts present in Japan at that time 
discovered that “while a foreigner could win the respect and sympathy of the Japanese people 
by exercising great deference to their culture and social needs, his welcome in the country 
was still limited in duration and degree” (Gooday & Low, 1998, p. 102). Nevertheless, rapid 
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technological, military and political development around the turn of the twentieth century, 
and growth of Japan’s modern industries and military capabilities, reflected an important new 
epoch in Japan’s engagement with world powers. 
 The transition from dependence on foreign technological expertise to emergence as a 
regional power created a surge in Japanese nationalistic sentiment, manifested in a change 
from a spirit of cooperation with the wider international community to one of confrontation 
and aggression over Japan’s imperial and territorial demands as envisioned in the concept of 
the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’. The influence of Japan’s military over 
domestic political affairs led to a desire among Japan’s leadership for territorial expansion 
abroad, beginning with the annexation of Korea in 1910. This developed into confrontation 
with the west, culminating in Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941. The conduct of 
Japan’s military and the attitudes and policies of colonial administrations in conquered 
territories inflicted such severe damage on Japan’s image among its geographic neighbours 
that the issues of war culpability and atrocities still have a profound influence on diplomatic 
relations between Japan and former colonies today.  
 Much political resistance to foreign integration and influence in Japan relates to 
twentieth century militarism and territorial aggression in one respect or another; for instance, 
right-wing opponents of the current national history curriculum in public schools argue that 
contemporary interpretations of this period were forced upon Japan from abroad following 
the Second World War (Jeans, 2005, p. 190). The vociferous protest and diplomatic rebuke 
Japan continues to receive from China, South Korea and elsewhere following periodic 
attempts to ‘tone down’ war culpability as part of history lessons in schools are cited as 
unjustifiable foreign interference in Japan’s domestic political and historical discourse (Pyle, 
1983, p. 299). 
 The impact of total military defeat in 1945 led Japan into a postwar period of political 
uncertainty. Postwar occupation heightened foreign involvement in Japan’s domestic affairs 
and foreign policy. Japan’s political structure was to be profoundly influenced by 
developments in the Cold War abroad, particularly events taking place in China and Korea. 
Political pluralisation and many liberal reforms of the immediate postwar period were diluted 
or reversed in efforts to ensure that Japan would not fall under Communist influence. In this 
unstable political climate, the business conglomerates that were a characteristic feature of 
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Japan’s wartime economy (and that had been broken up following Japan’s defeat) were 
allowed to regroup, and centre-right political parties coalesced into the extremely powerful 
LDP, which would come to dominate electoral politics in Japan over the second half of the 
twentieth century. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida’s government entered into a Security 
Treaty between the United States and Japan that took effect in April 1952, guaranteeing 
American strategic military support in exchange for allowing American military personnel to 
be stationed on Japanese soil.  
 The Yoshida Doctrine prioritised economic recovery and growth over sovereign 
independence in foreign relations; many conservative observers came to interpret this as 
another example of foreign interference in Japan’s domestic affairs, drawing parallels 
between the Mutual Security Treaty and the ‘unequal’ agreements forced on Japan by the 
United States almost a century earlier at the time of the Kanagawa Treaty (Perez, 1998, pp. 
161-162). A lack of leverage for Japan’s government in negotiations with the United States 
over mutual security led to the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in June 2010, 
following failure to secure the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa 
(Hongo, 2010).6 The indefinite presence of American military bases on Japanese territory 
presents an image to the public of enduring diplomatic weakness and subservience to the 
United States on matters of global security policy, along with broader dependency on the 
United States to defend Japan from challenges and threats in Japan’s geographic region and 
former colonies. 
 Dependence on international allies for security contrasted with Japan’s status as a 
world economic leader during the latter half of the twentieth century. In tying Japan’s 
military and defence interests to cooperation with the United States, the Yoshida Doctrine 
shifted the national focus towards economic recovery and growth. As a result, Japan enjoyed 
a period of sustained economic growth from the 1950s to the 1980s, re-establishing Japan’s 
credibility as a world political and economic player. Government-subsidised investments in 
key industries and manufacturing sectors (such as steel, chemicals, electronics, car-building, 
ship-building and other heavy manufacturing ventures) developed Japan into a large-scale 
                                                          
6
 The U.S. military presence in Japan remains a controversial subject, attracting an unusual degree of protest and 
condemnation from the Japanese public. This strength of feeling primarily relates to the conduct of American 
military personnel within local communities, symbolised in public opinion by the abduction and rape of a 
schoolgirl by American servicemen in Okinawa in 1995, an incident that provoked widespread public outrage 
and resentment throughout Japan (Shimizu, 2008). 
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export producer, and were tied to policies discouraging domestic consumer spending and 
promoting high savings and investment rates (Prestowitz, 2010, p. 34). As western companies 
increasingly sought inspiration from Japanese corporate models and management techniques, 
Japan was again able to exert international influence as a world leader and economic power.7 
 This period of economic growth, development and prosperity came to an abrupt halt 
at the end of 1989 with the sudden collapse of Tokyo real estate prices and the consequent 
deflation of Japan’s ‘bubble economy’. Stagnant economic growth throughout the 1990s (the 
so-called ‘lost decade’) and the fall of Japanese banks from world-leading status to a position 
of comparative obscurity in global finance caused world attention to shift away from Japan in 
favour of the rising Asian economic powers such as Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, China and 
South Korea. As a result of the 2008 recession and global economic downturn, an 
exaggerated dependence on exports has caused Japan’s economy to further contract. The 
inability of domestic consumption in Japan to offset declines in export sales suggests that 
Japan‘s prospects for economic recovery will ultimately be determined to a great extent by 
the ebb and flow of foreign demand for Japan’s exported goods, subject to intensifying 
competition with China and other major exporters in the region (Tabuchi, 2009). 
 Japan’s present-day resistance to immigration reform must be understood in the 
context of these historical events, as they represent the background and origins of 
contemporary attitudes to foreigners. Essentially, early missionary activities in Japan from 
the mid-1500s established an enduring distrust of the motivations of foreigners with regard to 
Japan’s national interests. This distrust came to characterise even the comparatively open 
Meiji era, and was intensified during periods of war with foreign powers. Strategic 
manipulation of Japan during the Cold War only served to cement suspicions that Japan 
would remain dependent on stronger allies and vulnerable to the consequences of foreign 
political goals and priorities. Distrust of foreign influence is perceptible today in policies that 
aim to consolidate the personal details of migrants and that impose severe restrictions on 
Japan’s foreign residents (to be discussed in the section that follows). Similarly, foreign 
                                                          
7
 It was during this period that Japan’s government first experimented with accepting labour migrants of 
Japanese ancestry from Latin America, addressing a shortage of unskilled labour that had appeared as a result of 
improved living standards and rising wages in the Japanese labour market. These migrants were required to fill 
positions described as ‘3K’, a term derived from the Japanese kitsui (‘difficult’), kitanai (‘dirty’) and kiken 
(‘dangerous’), which gradually came to be shunned by a growing middle-class of educated Japanese workers in 
favour of white-collar careers. 
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economic interests are perceived in Japanese business circles to have challenged and 
undermined Japan’s postwar economic successes (Wood, 1992, pp. 28-29). For these reasons, 
calls from abroad for Japan to enact immigration reforms have met with a negative reception 
on the part of Japan’s government and bureaucracy. 
 However, historical events represent only part of a larger understanding of Japan’s 
current immigration policy outlook. The next section will discuss current immigration and 
labour policy implementation in Japan, addressing the ways in which the instinct to insulate 
Japan from foreign influence (as described above) manifests in contemporary migrant hiring 
and employment practices. 
 
Migrants and Japan’s labour market: Barriers to participation  
 Though Japanese policymakers apparently prefer not to reform immigration policy for 
historical reasons, abject shortages of labour in crucial sectors of Japan’s economy have 
created considerable pressure in favour of allowing migrant workers to make labour 
contributions in many important industries. Though Japanese employers are often eager to 
hire migrant workers to make up for local labour shortages, complicated bureaucratic 
obstacles stand in the way of effectively employing migrants in Japan’s businesses and social 
services. These obstacles severely restrict employment opportunities for migrants and 
undermine the basic viability of migrant employment in key sectors of the economy, even in 
cases where those positions cannot realistically be filled by Japanese workers. Though it can 
be argued that migrant employment initiatives have potential to improve economic outcomes 
for Japanese society and industry, and represent negligible competition to domestic workers, 
Japan’s immigration and employment laws have conspired to systematically undermine 
legitimate hiring of workers abroad. 
 Foreign employment in the healthcare sector in Japan provides an illustrative example 
of difficulties in securing and employing migrant workers, even those with highly-specialised 
skills. As Japan has aged rapidly in demographic terms, a huge employment shortfall has 
developed in caregiving services for the elderly. The number of nurses and home helpers 
required to meet the needs of Japan’s aged population is projected to grow to 470,000 by the 
year 2025, a 40 percent increase on 2005 employment levels in that sector (Coulmas, 2007, p. 
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120). Some of this shortfall is expected to be made up through semi-formal social policy 
changes, by calling on retired healthcare professionals and community volunteers to 
contribute to elderly care to a greater extent in the future (BBC News, 2009). Healthcare has 
been one of the first highly-skilled professional sectors in Japan to benefit from a limited 
relaxation of labour laws, allowing trained migrants to work in Japan as a component of 
bilateral trade liberalisation. Fully-qualified nursing staff and certified caregivers from the 
Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries are permitted to work in Japan for periods of 
three or four years, with the same rights and protections enjoyed by Japanese staff in similar 
positions. However, these workers are required by law to pass extremely demanding Japanese 
language proficiency tests involving knowledge of highly-specialised medical terms in order 
to extend their work visas beyond the initial three or four year employment period, a goal that 
as few as 2 percent of candidates successfully achieve (BBC News, 2010b). Regulations 
stipulating these kinds of conditions restrict migrant employment in two ways: they 
drastically reduce candidate numbers to the few who can successfully meet the exceedingly 
demanding language and professional requirements demanded under the law, and discourage 
Japanese organisations from hiring migrant workers because of the likelihood that they will 
fail to meet these requirements. 
 The cases of skilled Filipino workers filling critically understaffed positions in Japan 
compare with those of Nikkeijin, or Latin American workers of Japanese descent that began 
to return-emigrate to Japan in large numbers during the 1990s as part of a government 
strategy to fill unskilled positions in the then-booming manufacturing and heavy-industry 
sectors, particularly around industrial centres in Aichi, Shizuoka, Gunma and Kanagawa 
prefectures (Shipper, 2008, p. 39). The decision to allow Nikkeijin to live and work in Japan 
was closely tied to Japanese lineage, based on assumptions that migrants of Japanese ethnic 
descent would be better able to adapt to Japan’s society and culture. It was intended that this 
would negate the social and economic costs of migrant integration, even though those 
migrants had mostly never lived in Japan previously, spoke little or no Japanese, and were 
accustomed to the cultural values and practices of their home countries. As Japan’s 
unemployment rate began to climb in an era of economic downturn, official perceptions of 
these previously-favoured Nikkei labourers changed markedly in the context of debates over 
foreign workers and Japan’s unemployment problems. 
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Observers such as Shipper (2008) and Yamanaka (2008) link Nikkei immigration 
policies to deep-seated exclusionary attitudes on the part of Japan’s Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare, arguing that these attitudes have produced stratified or tiered 
immigration and labour policies depending upon the specific ethnic and cultural backgrounds 
of the immigrant communities involved. As Shipper puts it, “this racialised hierarchy – which 
produces differentiated jobs, wages, rights, and privileges for different groups of foreigners – 
is a political construction of the Japanese government, rooted in a cultural view that certain 
races and nationalities are uniquely qualified for certain kinds of labour” (p. 25). Though 
Nikkeijin were at first assumed to enjoy advantages by virtue of ethnic fraternity with the 
wider community in Japan, evidence suggests that Nikkeijin suffer significant social 
discrimination, meeting with “a cold reception by the Japanese who regarded and treated 
them as inferior to true Japanese” (Yamanaka, 2008, p. 189). Nikkeijin have also endured 
exploitation in the workplace as a result of the subcontract-based models of businesses that 
typically employ Nikkeijin, which facilitate little or no access to public or private health, 
welfare, employment or accident-related insurance benefits  (Shipper, 2008, pp. 40-41). 
Tolerance of Nikkeijin deteriorated further as unemployment levels increased steadily 
following Japan’s 1989 economic collapse. Nikkeijin are now subjected to government 
pressure to encourage repatriation to South America as part of efforts to improve the 
appearance of domestic unemployment statistics. Following the global economic recession of 
2008 and downturns in Japan’s export sales and production, Nikkeijin were invited to take a 
repatriation allowance of 300,000 yen (with additional payments for each family member) to 
leave Japan permanently under an emergency measure introduced by the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare in April 2009. Approximately 17,000 people had accepted the offer of 
paid repatriation by the end of that year (OECD, 2010). Such a massive policy reversal (from 
promoting return migration to rejecting return migrants) serves to demonstrate the tenuous 
degree of tolerance of migrant workers in Japan’s labour market today. 
 Repatriation of Nikkei return migrants raises the question of whether migrant workers 
in Japan actually threaten to deprive local workers of their livelihoods, particularly in light of 
the ‘dirty, difficult and dangerous’ nature of the work migrants are generally hired to 
undertake. An example of the image of migrant labour as a threat to mainstream workers was 
provided in 2004 by a controversial website created by the Ministry of Justice Immigration 
Bureau. This provided an outlet for Japanese citizens to anonymously inform on foreign 
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residents suspected to be overstaying or working illegally in Japan. According to media 
reports at that time, suggestions on this website (as justifications for submitting reports on 
foreign residents) included, “Was fired due to violator”, and “Couldn’t get work due to 
violator” (Arudou, 2004). As seen in this instance, unemployment problems in Japan have 
already been attributed to migrants by government and bureaucratic sources. 
In considering whether empirical evidence supports claims that migrant workers 
embody a threat to employment for local workers, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer and Josef 
Zweimuller (1999) argue that strategies intending to address unemployment by removing 
migrant workers from the labour market typically overlook important economic and social 
realities of labour migration in host countries. These include recognition that immigrant 
workers often cannot perfectly substitute for local labour in most industries and professions, 
that wages for migrants and costs of their employment do not always undercut those of local 
workers, and that immigrants cannot necessarily replace local workers on a direct one-to-one 
basis without creating complicated follow-on effects for economic development. Regardless 
of these arguments, potential employers of migrants in Japan must contend with negative 
public perceptions of migrant responsibility for high unemployment levels. This view is 
endorsed by Japan’s government, as can be seen by the targeted removal of migrant workers 
in response to public disaffection over unemployment, leading to harsh official crackdowns 
on migrants in the mid-2000s (Clark, 2009). This situation endures in Japan today, even as 
many Japanese businesses find themselves in desperate need of workers. 
 Partly as a result of the practical difficulties associated with legitimate migrant 
employment in Japan, some industries hire migrants in an illegitimate capacity, often as 
undocumented labourers or as ‘entertainers’ (a common euphemism to describe roles in the 
hospitality, nightclub or sex industries). These businesses provide livelihoods for many 
thousands of undocumented migrant workers in Japan. While these workers generally enter 
Japan legally with short-term visas, they are often compelled by poor wages and personal 
circumstances to remain in Japan illegally after the expiry of their visas. This scenario is 
reported in the cases of women from Asian countries entering Japan under ‘entertainer’-
category visas whose illegal status is exploited by predatory employers, who compel them to 
work as bar hostesses and prostitutes (The Japan Times, 2005). The difficulty of obtaining 
valid work visas in Japan has facilitated a proliferation of human trafficking networks, 
creating opportunities for organised crime syndicates to become powerful players in migrant 
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employment. Labour shortages have also created parallel demand for undocumented manual 
labourers to take on the most arduous of ‘3K’ jobs in Japan; by the late 1990s, approximately 
300,000 undocumented migrants were estimated to be working in Japan, in addition to 
legally-documented migrant workers employed in roles outside the stipulated conditions of 
their visas (Douglass & Roberts, 2003, p. 7). 
 The visibility of migrant workers in Japan, and misleading associations of foreign 
workers with unemployment and economic problems, are used by Japan’s policymakers to 
justify political inertia and bureaucratic resistance to immigration reform. Efforts to crack 
down on migrant employment by agencies such as the Ministry of Justice Immigration 
Bureau enjoy official and popular support; the discretionary powers of Japan’s Justice 
Minister to issue special amnesty permits to undocumented migrants in Japan have been 
strenuously opposed by conservative groups (Matsutani, 2009). This climate of opposition 
further exacerbates the difficulties of legitimate Japanese employers that could benefit from 
the labour of migrant workers under more favourable conditions. As Clark (2009) states, 
Japan at present “is busy expelling just the kind of people it says it needs”. 
 The examples noted in this section demonstrate how practical obstacles to legitimate 
migrant employment in Japan are often closely tied to cultural considerations and politics of 
national identity. Of course, this is also the case in many other host countries. However, I 
contend that interactions between historical, practical and cultural factors characterise Japan’s 
responses to demographic change in a distinctive way. In the following section, political and 
cultural arguments against allowing a greater migrant worker presence within Japanese 
society reveal the central importance of monoethnic and monocultural ideology to Japan’s 
policymaking structure. As we have already seen, similar arguments inform many 
conventional interpretations of reasons for Japan’s unwillingness to implement immigration 
reform. In contrast, the discussion that follows will reveal how social structure and political 
expediency produce a binary, ‘us-and-them’ policy perspective that ultimately holds back 






Cultural and political constraints 
 Japanese perspectives on immigration reform must be understood with regard to 
political pressures and constructions of a unified national identity that became dominant 
during the second half of the twentieth century. As we have already seen, the assumption of 
Japan being a monoethnic and monocultural society has been central to Japan’s social policy 
debates, both within and outside the country. Though perceptions of Japan as the seat of a 
unique language, culture, heritage and ethnicity have resonated in domestic politics since at 
least as far back as the Tokugawa era, the concept of Japan as a fully homogenous and unified 
society came to be firmly established after the Second World War. Enduring belief in this 
concept on the part of officials and the public at large leaves non-Japanese migrants isolated 
and vulnerable to political harassment. Foreign communities have been targeted and blamed 
by government agencies and conservative politicians not only for Japan’s present economic 
weaknesses and unemployment, but also for crime and other social problems. 
 Japan’s demographic crisis challenges policymakers to ease economic and social 
symptoms of depopulation while also striving to sustain idealised concepts of a ‘pure’ 
homogenous society. Evidence suggests that government agencies engage in open cultural 
discrimination in order to justify policies that seek to uphold the ideal of a homogenous 
society against calls for liberalised immigration reform. In this section, examples of these 
policies and practices will be discussed in order to clarify prevailing attitudes toward 
migrants among Japan’s bureaucratic and political elites. The fundamental reasons for these 
attitudes are complex, as rapid changes in Japan’s influence and prestige in the world have 
joined with pressing problems in Japan’s governing institutions at home to discourage more 
extensive efforts toward intercultural engagement. 
 The object of establishing an ideology of cultural and linguistic uniformity across the 
country, and of promoting the concept of a monoethnic and homogenous Japanese society, 
evolved over time from a reflection of nineteenth-century imperial and colonial beliefs in 
natural racial and cultural hierarchies toward a desire for social and political stability as a 
platform for continued economic growth. Lie (2001) refers to this development as “the rise of 
a new nationalism born of newfound prosperity” (p. 132). Social stability and predictability 
developed into a central policy priority for the LDP during a fifty-year period of electoral 
ascendancy, enjoying widespread and prolonged popular approval. As Lie states, “Many 
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supported the conservative Liberal Democratic Party not so much as a principled ideological 
position but rather to preserve the stability of everyday life” (p. 49). The outcome of this has 
been that social homogeneity has now become an established framework of public debate 
over the role of migrants in Japanese society. This framework shapes contemporary debate 
with little consideration given as to whether monoethnic and monocultural assumptions 
remain valid, or whether they provide suitable foundations for sustainable social policy. 
Advocates of migrant rights and migrant employment in Japan have been obliged to engage 
with the debate under conditions in which, as Lie states, the terms of “explicit discussion of 
new foreign workers almost always brought the presumption of Japanese monoethnicity to 
the forefront” (p. 49). 
 Japanese government policy throughout the twentieth century has reflected a 
discourse of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. This view has profoundly affected not only the 
lives of foreign residents and communities in Japan, but also those of indigenous groups 
whose languages, cultural practices and ethnic backgrounds serve to undermine the validity 
of monocultural ideology.8 This section will discuss and explain the effects of these attitudes 
and policies, arguing that migrant communities are key examples of diversity in 
contemporary Japanese society. 
 Beginning in the early 1870s, Japan’s central government implemented policies to 
assimilate indigenous ethnic and cultural minorities into the dominant culture under the guise 
of educating and civilising the extremities of Japanese territory. These policies laid 
foundations for the denials of diversity at the heart of Japan’s monoethnic and monocultural 
ideology today. A range of laws were passed (such as the Hokkaido Former Natives 
Protection Act of March 1899) that prohibited the exercise of indigenous customs such as 
tattooing, ear piercing and traditional hunting, and included regulations that discouraged the 
use of indigenous language and that forced indigenous communities to relocate away from 
valuable agricultural land. In the case of the Ainu, Japan’s central government until very 
recently refused to acknowledge or accept responsibility for these policies and events. 
Despite Japan’s vote in favour of the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of 
                                                          
8
 Examples of prominent indigenous ethnic and cultural groups in Japan include the Ainu of Hokkaido, native 
inhabitants of Okinawa, and also to some extent burakumin, or descendants of an historical social underclass 
long associated with occupations such as undertaking, butchery, leatherworking and other trades considered to 
be impure by conventional Japanese social standards. 
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Indigenous Peoples in September 2007, the government still refused to officially recognise 
the status of Ainu as an indigenous minority group until as recently as June 2008 (Ito, 2008). 
A similar series of policies affected native Okinawans from the time of Okinawa’s 
annexation in 1879. Centralised education and regulations aimed to assimilate Okinawan 
society into mainstream Japan and sought to suppress local languages and customs in favour 
of “the spirit of the Japanese nation” (Allen, 2009, p. 192). These colonial policies set an 
important precedent for the development of modern monocultural ideology. 
 Policies that came to assume cultural and ethnic homogeneity evolved further in the 
large-scale urban shift and decline of regional loyalties and diversity that occurred as part of 
industrial recovery and expansion from the 1950s onward. These policies brought about the 
cultural integration of mainstream society around Japan’s industrial economy during the 
1960s (Lie, 2001, p. 126). Examples of regulations of the period that aimed to sustain ideals 
of Japanese social homogeneity can be seen in residency laws that specifically related to 
Japan’s ‘special permanent residents’, in particular Zainichi communities (a term describing 
long-term Korean residents of Japan). Korean migrants that entered Japan during the period 
of colonial rule were deprived of the right to political representation by an amendment to 
Japan’s Election Law in December 1945, and were declared to be foreign nationals (thereby 
denying many human rights protections) in the context of Article 13 of the Peace Constitution 
(Shipper, 2008, pp. 32-33). As a consequence of these measures, even those Zainichi who 
had been born in Japan were required to submit to fingerprinting and to carry alien 
registration documents. The only way for Zainichi to avoid these discriminatory measures 
was to become a naturalised Japanese citizen, a process that required the renunciation of 
one’s Korean name in favour of a Japanese name (Shipper, 2008, p. 34). Those who chose to 
retain their Korean cultural identity and name were regarded in Japanese law as foreign 
residents until 1965, when the ‘special permanent resident’ visa category was introduced, but 
continued to be subject to fingerprinting as part of alien registration until as recently as 1993.9 
Zainichi currently also remain prohibited from voting in national elections or seeking 
employment in most of Japan’s national civil services (Shipper, 2008, pp. 34-35). These 
                                                          
9
 Increased border security resulting from international terrorism concerns have been invoked as justification for 
a return to fingerprinting of migrant communities in Japan, a practice that had been finally abolished in 1999 





policies provide indications of the philosophical outlook in policymaking circles toward the 
rights and social roles of non-Japanese residents, and demonstrate some of the methods used 
to exclude non-Japanese residents based on ethnic and cultural background. As Chung (2010) 
observes, “The official stance toward immigrants suggests that non-Japanese do not have the 
capacity to become Japanese and, therefore, should be excluded” (p. 3). 
 Counterbalances to Japan’s monocultural orthodoxy are provided primarily by non-
governmental organisations concerned with promoting intercultural understanding and 
acknowledgement of rights for migrants and foreign residents. These organisations organise 
collective action around important issues affecting foreign residents in Japan (such as the 
Zainichi fingerprinting controversy), collect statistics relating to foreigners and migration, 
inform migrants of their legal rights and obligations, submit proposals to government 
agencies regarding public policy affecting migrant workers and foreign residents, and 
publicise some of the difficulties faced by foreigners in mainstream public discourse (Shipper, 
2008, pp. 166-171). These initiatives have helped to reshape expectations in Japan as to the 
responsibility of government at all levels to provide social services for non-Japanese residents 
(pp. 128-129). Advocacy organisations for migrants have typically operated under the 
auspices of wider social activist networks in Japan, comprising faith-based groups, worker 
unions and women’s support groups, as well as legal and medical not-for-profit community 
organisations (pp. 89-90). The existence of these organisations and their modest successes in 
creating a more inclusive atmosphere for migrants in the public arena indicate that acceptance 
of homogenous social ideology in Japan is far from universal. Nevertheless, their potential to 
bring about proactive long-term change in Japan’s social attitudes in the face of conventional 
monoethnic social messages is heavily restricted by established policies based around 
homogenous ideals. 
 Given the importance of monoethnic and monocultural ideology to Japan’s political 
culture, the prospect of allowing large numbers of migrant labourers into Japan threatens to 
bring fundamental change to established interpretations of Japanese national identity. In the 
past, migrant communities have typically been isolated and dispersed, with few outlets for 
political representation and little real power to agitate for greater recognition or rights. Much 
political opposition to immigration reform stems from fear of the potential political power of 
migrant communities unified around common interests. Such a situation occurred in the early 
1990s, when significant numbers of Iranian immigrant labourers began to congregate socially 
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in Yoyogi Park in central Tokyo. By creating a large and highly-visible mass presence in a 
prominent public place, displaying distinctively foreign cultural traits and practices (such as 
makeshift street vendor markets), the gatherings stirred considerable discomfort among 
officials and members of the public, and were eventually blocked in 1993 on the pretext of 
carrying out renovations and beautification (Machimura, 2003). Essentially, visible migrant 
communities from non-East Asian ethnic and cultural backgrounds are seen to embody a 
threat to policy structures based on homogenous social ideals. 
As a central premise, Japan’s discourse of social homogeneity assumes not only that 
Japan is monocultural today, but has always been so throughout history, regardless of the 
fragmented state of Japanese society and culture prior to the Meiji Restoration; as Lie (2001) 
puts it, “The recent vintage of monoethnic ideology does not prevent the imagined present 
from transforming the misty past in its image” (p. 141). Gatherings of migrant groups create 
an impression of unrestrained social change being imposed upon society from beyond Japan’s 
shores, and raise the prospect of immigration reforms leading to public displays of migrant 
solidarity, raising fears of the potential for migrants to engage in unified mass political action. 
This situation perhaps reflects an uncomfortable discord between contemporary national 
identity discourses based on social homogeneity, and the obvious multicultural realities to be 
observed in Japan’s urban centres. For these reasons, current immigration policy is directed at 
ensuring that migrant communities blend into society in ways that are neither clearly visible 
nor unified to the extent that they could eventually develop into forces for change within 
Japan’s political system. According to Machimura (2003), Japan’s immigration policy has 
been constructed in such a way that “ordinary Japanese citizens have little exposure to 
[foreigners] and thus little opportunity to develop a positive image of them. The widespread 
stereotype that migrant workers might be illegal has enhanced negative attitudes” (p. 186). As 
a result, growth of foreign communities “has often brought about a conservative or defensive 
attitude among local Japanese residents” (p. 187). 
 The presence of migrants in Japanese society on a significant scale also threatens a 
model of social and ethnic uniformity considered indispensible by many in government and 
bureaucracy to Japan’s postwar economic successes. As such, the beliefs that underlie this 
ideology continue to profoundly affect policymaking today. The lack of precedent for a mass 
influx of foreign settlers into Japan is an important component in explanations for why 
migrant communities face such antipathy to their presence. Conflict between Japan’s 
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economic need for access to migrant labour and political and social desires to maintain at 
least the facade of monoethnicity introduces a form of cognitive dissonance to Japanese 
politics; as demographic problems continue to develop, they may force substantial (and 
unwelcome) re-examinations of Japan’s cultural identity. Put another way, the demographic 
and economic compulsion to employ large numbers of migrants in Japan has potential power 
to change the very social frameworks and belief systems to which Japan’s postwar economic 
successes are attributed by the government and bureaucracy.  
 The resonance in political discourse of images of migrants causing ‘disruption’ to 
social and economic ‘harmony’ encourages politicians and conservative commentators to 
court popular support by promoting negative representations and stereotypes of foreigners. 
As has already been mentioned, conservative Japanese politicians and bureaucrats regularly 
conflate migrant communities with national crime rate increases, economic problems and 
domestic unemployment. Politicised attacks on immigration reform and migrant workers 
serve the short-term interests of conservative politicians and bureaucrats “as part of their 
strategies to garner political support and/or institutional expansion within the government” 
(Shipper, 2008, pp. 156-157). Negative depictions of migrants also serve to distract attention 
from instances of weakness in government, as confidence in politicians declined precipitously 
in the wake of corruption scandals involving prominent members of both major political 
parties in Japan - most recently that surrounding former DPJ President and Secretary General 
Ichiro Ozawa concerning charges of financial impropriety (BBC News, 2010c). 
Hardened factionalisation of Japanese politics has also contributed to public disaffection, 
with a series of governments rendered ineffectual with regard to honouring election campaign 
promises and popular reforms. Watanabe (1997) argues that Japan’s continuous economic 
growth from the 1950s to the 1980s imbued Japan’s bureaucracy with such an immense 
degree of power and influence over policy that the elected branches of government today are 
severely restricted in their ability to exert full and independent authority over economic and 
social policymaking. Van Wolferen (1989) claims that Japan’s present political structure 
renders elected officials “incapable of delivering on political promises they may make 
concerning commercial or other matters requiring important adjustments by one of the [other] 
components of the [political] system” (p. 6). This situation has produced a string of 
prominent policy failures and a series of prime ministerial resignations (four since the 
resignation of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in September 2006). In this context, 
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immigration reform occupies a low priority for many in government (Harlan, 2010). 
Consequently, officials have responded in part to problems of economic underperformance 
and domestic unemployment with hard-line policy stances against migrants and crackdowns 
on undocumented migrant workers (Masters, 2009).  
Opposition to immigration reform also mobilises more extreme uyoku dantai groups in 
their efforts to gain influence at the fringes of the political spectrum. As already discussed, 
the immigration debate is a focal point for the hard-line political stances of nationalist groups 
in Japan. Support for more restrictive immigration laws allows Japan’s conservatives to 
market themselves as resolute defenders of Japan’s national interests from foreign 
interference (Matsutani, 2009). 
Overall, anti-migrant sentiments in public policy and electoral politics can be regarded as 
a measure of uncertainty in the stability of Japan’s current political and ideological structure. 
Confronted by the realities of demographic change and depopulation, and hemmed in by 
conservative bureaucratic pressures and public disapproval, government is limited in its 
capacity (and willingness) to take action on immigration issues in a decisive and effective 
way. That is to say, political disincentives to revitalise Japan’s immigration regime are 
responsible for the apparent lack of urgency seen in official responses to demographic decline 
and depopulation.  
The three preceding sections have related the background of government inaction in 
response to the demographic crisis: Japan’s policymakers retain a deeply-held historical 
distrust of foreign communities in Japan, actively implement policies that hinder migrant 
participation in society and the economy, and face a range of very significant political 
disincentives that sap enthusiasm for immigration policy reform. But more importantly, these 
sections reveal the blueprint for a more profound resistance to policy reform. This is based on 
a conceptualisation of world affairs that severely limits Japan’s options for successful 
engagement with modern developments and trends in globalisation that could provide new 
and effective solutions to Japan’s demographic problems. The next two sections will describe 
the nature of Japan’s binary ‘us-and-them’ mindset, discuss the ways in which this mindset 
restricts Japan’s engagement with new models of transnational labour migration, and explain 
how Japan’s current restricted levels of global engagement are the key to understanding why 
Japan persists with refusal to accept migrants today. 
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Japan’s national concept of identity and relations with the global community 
The three broad discussions above (of historical, practical and political factors) are of 
central importance to understanding Japan’s demographic dilemma, as they coalesce within a 
larger discourse of Japanese national identity and contemporary political affairs. The 
interaction of these three discussions helps to define the limits of a binary, ‘us-and-them’ 
mindset that regards Japan (together with national political and economic interests) to be in 
opposition to foreign countries and cultures collectively. Attitudes to migrants in Japan 
originate from this mindset, as policies restricting the participation of migrants in Japanese 
society derive from the same set of ‘us-and-them’ assumptions. This section will draw the 
central aspects of the preceding sections together in order to further clarify the implications of 
this binary view of world affairs. The final section of this chapter will discuss Japan’s binary 
‘us-and-them’ mindset in the context of modern transnational labour migration and 
globalisation, and will elaborate my argument that this mindset has produced a set of 
immigration policies that fail to keep pace with developments in global population movement 
and community formation. 
The historical experience of Japan as an island nation has framed Japan’s current view of 
globalised politics. Constant concern over comparative levels of military power and 
economic strength in competition with Japan’s neighbours dating back into distant history – 
and continuing today in the form of territorial disputes with Russia, North and South Korea 
and China - has acted as the catalyst for cementing strategic visions for Japan as a kind of 
territorial and cultural ‘island fortress’ (termed shimaguni konjo in Japanese, literally ‘an 
island country mentality’). Combined with religious and spiritual traditions linking Japanese 
language, culture and ethnicity exclusively to the physical landmass of Japan (Hardacre, 1989, 
p. 5), historical events form the foundation of modern conceptions of Japan as ‘unique’ and 
‘isolated’, supposedly having neither ethnic or cultural communality with other nations, nor 
the strategic and economic unity of purpose felt by countries participating in a global 
‘community of nations’. Van Wolferen (1989) argues that Japan’s policymakers appear in 
many cases to have developed economic and foreign policy around a stance of neither having, 
nor wishing to acquire, a participatory stake in globalised world affairs. He claims that “Japan 
needs the world for its exports, to keep its economy running; but many in Japanese official 
positions appear to prefer their traditional isolation, wishing that the world with all its 
political complexities would leave their country alone” (p. 6). Similarly, Reischauer (1988) 
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characterises Japan’s policymakers as “simultaneously world leaders and world loners” (p. 
395). 
Seemingly intractable practical problems that actively discourage employment of 
migrants in Japan are typically explained away with reference to the ‘unsuitability’ of 
migrant workers in the context of Japan’s workplace expectations, national work ethic and 
cultural values. Closer examination shows that many of the problems facing migrant workers 
(and potential Japanese employers) are actually deliberate policy constructs based on 
conservative bureaucratic attitudes and protectionist ideas. The harshest restrictions on 
migrant workers (such as unrealistic demands for applied language proficiency as a condition 
for visa renewal that exceed even the standards that are expected of Japanese nationals in the 
same positions) dictate that migrants find themselves massively disadvantaged in the labour 
market; these regulations raise the incidental costs of hiring migrant workers to unfeasible 
levels for most potential employers. In the social sphere, continued demands for foreigners to 
carry alien registration documents coupled with harassment at the hands of police and other 
officials negatively affect quality of life for foreigners in Japan. These examples further 
reinforce bureaucratic and popular belief in an idea that foreign residents are not qualified to 
contribute to Japan’s political or social discourses, or to participate in future development of 
Japan’s culture and identity. Faced with overwhelming disadvantages in society and the 
workplace, migrants are essentially rejected as social and cultural contributors due to 
collective inability to overcome obstacles placed before them by Japan’s immigration and 
labour regulations. In this way, discrimination against migrants creates justification for its 
own continued existence in a self-perpetuating cycle, and the ideology of social homogeneity 
thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
As I have argued above, the reasons for this outlook must be understood in relation to 
historical precedent. For example, short-term hiring and periodic expulsion of foreign 
engineers and modernisation experts during the Meiji era became implicitly associated with 
economic growth, development and prosperity. Similarly, political expediency plays an 
important role in Japan’s restrictive immigration regime; examples are seen in the MOJ’s use 
of visa violation statistics as a rationalisation for crime rates, and as justification for greater 
consolidation of personal information of foreign residents. These policies and regulations 
reveal an ‘us-and-them’ dichotomy in policymaking between that which is construed to be 
natural, congruous and ‘Japanese’ in character, and that which is foreign, out of place and of 
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strict utility value to Japan for the purpose of gaining access to ‘outsider’ knowledge and 
information. As Reischauer (1988) summarises, “the line between uchi and soto – between 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ – [is] clear. A person [is] by race, language, culture and nation either 
fully Japanese or not a Japanese at all” (p. 396). 
The politics of immigration and citizenship in Japan create a policy structure that is a 
function of historical lore and traditional fears of ‘the other’ tied to self-imposed political and 
cultural isolation. By restricting and marginalising foreign communities in Japan, the 
government has also discouraged Japan’s population collectively from participating actively 
in the global community, thereby also restricting development of a popular sense of equality 
in social, cultural and political engagement with other countries. Policies based on the 
‘uniqueness’ and ‘homogeneity’ of Japanese society have legitimised public impressions of 
an unbridgeable gap between Japan and the ‘outside’ world, resulting in a kind of cultural 
insulation that contributes hugely to mainstream acceptance of the ‘homogenous society’ 
ideology itself. Further, these policies establish receptive grounds for nationalistic arguments 
opposing a modern Japanese identity that embraces foreign people, ideas and influences. Kerr 
(2001) claims that “few nations have erected such high barriers against foreign people and 
ideas” (p. 335); it can be seen that these barriers also apply just as effectively to mainstream 
Japan’s own capacity and desire to engage with the outside world. Isolation and limited 
intercultural communication are keystones of Japan’s monoethnic and monocultural ideology 
and of a conservative bureaucratic ‘us-and-them’ vision of Japan’s role in the global system. 
As Kerr concludes, “One cannot underestimate the shock that true globalisation would bring 
to a social system and economy like Japan’s, which depends so much on being cut off from 
the world” (p. 368). 
A brief look at popular discourse surrounding ‘Japanese uniqueness’ helps to clarify the 
extent of isolationist thought that sustains this binary ‘us-and-them’ mindset. Literary 
material on the subject is so common that it is recognised as a distinct field of 
pseudoscientific academic and cultural enquiry known as Nihonjinron (literally ‘discourse of 
the Japanese people’). Nihonjinron ostensibly aims to examine the ways in which Japan 
differs in a philosophical and anthropological sense from other nations. According to Dale 
(1986), Nihonjinron has a notable impact on the work of many scholars of Japanese culture, 
linguistics and social issues. He criticises the basic philosophies of Nihonjinron, 
characterising the field as “displaying a conceptual and procedural hostility to any mode of 
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analysis which might be seen to derive from external, non-Japanese sources” (p. i). 
Nihonjinron is noteworthy for the way that it emphasises profound differences between Japan 
and the rest of the world as a generalised whole, implying the impossibility of those born 
outside strict Japanese ethnic and cultural bounds to fully appreciate and understand the 
nuances of Japanese culture, language and customs.  
This attitude extends to Japanese nationals who are exposed to foreign cultures and 
languages by way of overseas travel or work experience. An illustrative example can be seen 
in the discrimination and suspicion faced by returnee Japanese children (known in Japanese 
as kikokushijo) who have gained experience of the world outside Japan through long-term 
study exchanges or parental work commitments. From the early 1970s, growth in numbers of 
these internationalised young people instigated the development of special education and 
social reintegration programmes arising from concerns that children may have “forgotten 
many of their Japanese language skills […] and have become imbued with non-Japanese 
ways of behaving, most notably with western ideas of individualism” (Goodman, 2003, p. 
178). Since the emergence of kikokushijo as a social phenomenon forty years ago, young 
returnees have encountered shifts in public and official attitudes and opinion, varying from 
sympathy regarding the educational disadvantages that overseas travel supposedly entailed, to 
impatience toward ‘non-Japanese’ attitudes absorbed while abroad, to resentment for high 
school, college and university quotas allowing kikokushijo to circumvent the standard 
national entry requirements for access to higher education (pp. 178-184). The emphasis of 
special programmes for the benefit of kikokushijo was “that children should be helped to 
become fully ‘Japanese’ again” (p. 181). These examples show how ‘uniqueness’ and 
monocultural ideology are reflections of a very distinctive political view of Japan at odds as a 
nation with an overwhelming, broadly-based definition of ‘the other’ that exists beyond 
Japan’s shores. According to this view, Japanese identity is defined not in contrast with any 
other particular culture or country (though specific international rivalries do inform Japanese 
policymaking and popular thought), but with the existence of a global system outside Japan 
more generally. 
Recognition of Japan’s binary approach to global affairs and intercultural relations is an 
essential step toward understanding why Japan continues to resist immigration reform. This 
binary approach powerfully influences the direction of Japan’s immigration debate in favour 
of the status-quo. An influx of migrants in the numbers necessary to offset demographic 
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change would strike at the heart of many conventional social beliefs and messages 
surrounding Japanese heritage and history, compromising the foundational assumptions of 
Japan’s national identity discourses upon which policymaking elites depend for authority and 
legitimacy. Further, it is very important to view Japanese attitudes to immigration within the 
context of globalised population movement and labour migration; though policymakers and 
conservative commentators in Japan may prefer not to engage with modern global migration 
frameworks, we will see that continued adherence to the isolationism of an earlier era locates 
Japanese policymakers firmly within a larger debate over effective utilisation of migrant 
labour in the twenty-first century. By turning attention now to international and globalised 
experiences of labour migration, I will connect Japan’s policies with well-established 
discourses of labour migration and economic development within the globalising 
international system. Taken together, these components will be developed into the core set of 
explanations for why Japan persists with refusal to implement immigration reforms, which 
are based on Japan’s present inability to effectively engage with globalised systems and 
communities. 
 
Labour migration and globalisation 
 Japan’s reluctance to consider immigration reform represents just one aspect of larger 
global debates over the development of modern transnational labour migration patterns. As 
such, an overview of modern migration in terms of trends in policy and academic analysis 
provides context for interpretation of Japan’s immigration conundrum. Generally speaking, 
scholars of transnational labour migration have identified broad shifts in approaches to 
understanding the effects and implications of transnational labour migration policy in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. These shifts have resulted from advances in 
technology, reductions in the real costs of travel and growth of international remittance flows 
as a driving force behind developing economies. The functional relationships between home 
and host countries have also undergone significant reinterpretation. These global 
developments form the backdrop against which Japan’s contemporary attitudes to 
immigration must be assessed in order to understand why Japan continues to resist 
immigration reform in the face of depopulation, demographic change and projected labour 
shortages. This section will explain these developments in transnational labour movement, 
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identifying and exploring two distinct phases of academic theory and policy orientation in the 
period since the end of the Second World War. The processes of change in migration patterns 
and policies from the postwar ‘long boom’ period into the modern globalised era shed light 
on Japan’s failure to engage effectively with the concepts and realities of globalisation.  
 Differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ theoretical concepts of migration since the 
Second World War have been characterised in terms of a shift away from straightforward 
national economic interest perspectives and utilitarian views of migrant labour toward more 
complex and fully integrated paradigms of migrant labour policy and utilisation. Castles and 
Miller (1998) identify two distinct phases in the development of transnational labour 
migration since the end of the Second World War. The first phase spanned the economic 
‘long boom’ period from 1945 to the early 1970s, in which a number of significant organised 
temporary labour migration programmes (such as Germany’s Gastarbeiter programme, and 
the Bracero programme between the U.S. and Mexico) appeared. It was intended that these 
programmes would allow large numbers of ostensibly temporary migrants to supplement 
domestic labour markets in host countries. The first phase came to an end with economic 
declines that followed the international oil crisis of 1973-4 (p. 67). 
  The second phase comprises the period from the mid-1970s to the present day. 
Castles and Miller (1998) argue that change came about as a result of global economic 
restructuring processes that followed the post-oil crisis recession, eventually combining with 
technological advances in industry to produce fundamental changes in patterns of world trade 
and global capital flows (p. 78). Elsewhere, Castles (2002) describes this era as one of 
“unprecedented social and cultural change” in host countries, brought about in part by the 
collapse of the international Cold War-era bipolar political structure (pp. 1143-1145). This 
change has been reflected in the emergence of more extensively multicultural host societies 
in the developed world. Stalker (2000) also identifies the 1970s oil shocks as a turning point 
in twentieth century migration, pointing to “political and other processes of globalisation” (p. 
26) as propulsive factors in the emergence of new models of population movement. 
 The evolution of relations between migrant workers and host societies has had 
important implications for government policymaking around the world. Developed countries 
have reacted to new migrant mobility by tightening immigration and labour regulations, 
creating significant political problems around issues of fair representation and human rights 
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in liberal democratic societies. Juss (2006) argues that immigration reform attempts around 
the world have been hampered in the past by an emphasis on the sovereign right of states to 
exclude migrants, stating that “free movement in law has, if anything, been subject to ever 
more restrictions in the developed world [in recent times]” (pp. 4-5). A specific example of 
these tensions can be seen in the refusal of the German government to remove restrictions on 
migrant workers from Poland until as recently as May 2011, a policy that conflicted with the 
European Court of Justice’s rulings on discriminatory hiring practices within the E.U. (BBC 
News, 2010a). Zolberg (2000) argues that the instinctive reaction of states at policy level to 
move toward more closed and restrictive immigration regulations reflects the uncertain status 
of national sovereignty in the globalised era, claiming that “restrictive immigration regime[s] 
prevail worldwide because [they] constitute a sine qua non for maintaining the Westphalian 
international state system as well as the privileged position of the ‘core’ states and their 
populations among highly unequal conditions” (p. 62). 
 The evolution of migration policy since the Second World War was largely dictated in 
the first instance by ‘long boom’ era economic assumptions and motivations in host countries 
that opted to supplement their own domestic labour resources by adopting guest worker 
programmes. According to Castles (2004), first phase guest worker programmes were 
essentially founded on a system of neoclassical economic assumptions, in the form of cost-
benefit calculations on the part of migrants in relation to earning potential in host countries, 
balanced against the practical ability of host countries to effectively regulate migrant 
residency and employment conditions (p. 208). A defining economic situation in many 
countries that introduced guest-worker programmes during this era (particularly European 
economic powers, such as France and Germany) was a shortage of domestic labour that 
resulted in very high overall levels of local employment (Stalker, 2000, pp. 28-29). It was 
assumed that migrant labourers could simply be removed from the labour market in times of 
recession, with minimal lasting impact on the social fabric of the host country. As Castles 
(2002) puts it, “no one foresaw enduring flows of migration from increasingly diverse source 
countries and the resulting emergence of multicultural societies” (p. 1145). For instance, in 
the case of 1970s recession-era Germany, it was found that immigrants had unexpectedly 
established social and family ties and networks that brought many more dependant migrants 
into German society and facilitated overstaying and undocumented employment  (Castles & 
Miller, 1998, p. 71). Host countries reacted by implementing more stringent and restrictive 
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labour migration policies, provoking debate over the feasibility of constructing immigration 
policies that would meet the economic requirements of host countries without incurring 
massive social costs and entrenching large underprivileged migrant sub-communities. 
Zolberg (2000) identifies two competing tendencies in immigration policymaking that 
appeared as a result of these experiences: The first viewed immigration purely in market 
economic terms, regarding the flow of migrants (as an economic resource) around the world 
in the same manner as globalised capital flows and as driven by basic market forces (that is, a 
view based on the same underlying principles as first phase guest worker programmes). The 
second reflects a more recent tendency to substantively integrate domestic political stability, 
social impacts, national identity issues and potential for widespread social disharmony into 
immigration policy development and debates (p. 62). 
 With the shortcomings of first phase models in mind, second phase migration models 
have developed with the goal of integrating solutions to some of the problems described 
above. Second phase models aim to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of temporary 
labour migration by considering effective social integration of migrant workers, development 
and incorporation of international human rights norms, revised incentive structures intended 
to minimise migrant overstaying, and management of modern transnational patterns of 
circular migration. Each of these factors has played a role in thoroughly changing the 
functions and expected outcomes of labour migration initiatives since the 1970s, both on 
conceptual and practical levels. 
 Second phase migration models and policies aim to incorporate social integration 
measures into immigration policy to a far greater extent than was ever seen in first phase 
guest worker programmes. Second phase initiatives identify the need to regard effective 
social integration strategies for migrant workers as an essential component of modern policy 
formation, and for policymakers to plan for ongoing social and economic effects that might 
arise from introducing migrant workers into the local labour market. Castles (2004) argues in 
favour of progressive immigration policy taking a more far-reaching and intensive form than 
that of past guest worker programmes, claiming that “migration policies may fail if they are 
based on a short-term view of the migratory process […] It is necessary to analyse the 
migratory process as a long-term social process with its own dynamics” (p. 207). 
Transnational labour migration on a global scale has brought into existence circular or 
repetitive migration patterns, disproving assumptions that migrants would necessarily settle 
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permanently in a specific host country, or embark on a temporary work sojourn in that 
country with the firm intention of returning home after a certain period (p. 211). 
Other areas of change take international norms into account as part of the new reality 
of migration on a global scale. Castles (2004) argues that recognition of basic human rights 
now acts to constrain the power of state sovereignty to effectively control migrant labour 
flows in the manner proposed during the ‘long boom’ (p. 216). As Sassen (2009) states in the 
context of migration in Europe: “The institutional development of the European Union and 
the strengthening of the European Human Rights Court are a partial denationalising of what 
has historically been constructed as national. […] This distancing is partially triangulated by 
some of the E.U. institutions, by the human rights regime, and by the ascendance of 
transnational civil society”. NGO advocacy groups (as described above in the context of 
Japan) have provided a voice on behalf of migrant communities within host countries’ 
mainstream political discourses – a movement Sassen describes as “the emergence of 
multiple actors, groups, and communities increasingly keen on broader notions of political 
membership”. Other developments include more substantive recognition of migrants’ rights 
in the legal structure of host countries; as Guiraudon (2000) explains, “scholarly interest in 
[rights-based] norms […] re-emerged in the late 1980s as a legitimate competitor to interest-
based or power-based explanations in international relations” (p. 1089). In essence, second 
phase models of migration reject previous policies and theories that saw migrants merely as 
disempowered units of unskilled labour with little scope to affect host societies beyond their 
contribution of economic value.  
 Second phase migration models also aim to address the fundamental problem of 
migrant overstaying in host countries, which came to be regarded as a central weakness of 
first phase guest worker programmes. At the end of the ‘long boom’ era, Germany found that 
guest workers from Italy, Greece and Turkey had established family connections and social 
networks in Germany, and were unwilling to return to their home countries when their terms 
of employment ended. A similar situation undermined the Bracero programme in the U.S., 
where exploitation of Mexican migrant workers ultimately served to enable subsequent 
patterns of overstaying, illegal immigration and undocumented migrant employment. Second 
phase models incorporate a range of policy modifications that aim to alleviate this problem. 
Basok (2002) points to the Canadian Mexican Agricultural Seasonal Workers’ Programme as 
an example of effective migrant labour management, identifying modifications of policy from 
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first phase models that have proved effective in restricting overstaying and undocumented 
employment to negligible levels.10 These include guest worker programme structures that 
balance the economic interests of employers with workers’ rights and the demands of local 
labour representatives. In comparison, first phase models (specifically the Bracero 
programme) overemphasised the interests of large and powerful agricultural employers of 
migrants above all other interest groups (p. 220). According to Basok, guaranteed better 
conditions for migrants improve working conditions for all labourers (domestic or foreign) in 
any given industry by minimising the incentives for abuse of vulnerable undocumented 
workers (p. 221). Basok also emphasises the importance of establishing good relations 
between employers and workers as a function of policy, thereby minimising incentives for 
worker abuse and desertion. She argues that deliberate selection of workers who maintain 
strong family and economic ties with their home countries (in contrast to a policy of hiring 
workers in desperate circumstances prepared to work for extremely low wages) ensures that 
migrant workers have economic and sentimental investments in their home countries, 
reducing the likelihood of indefinite overstaying following conclusion of their employment (p. 
224). Martin (2007) similarly argues in favour of strategic modifications of immigration 
policy, claiming that “some good could come from [new guest worker programmes], but only 
if the lessons of the past are understood” (p. 32). Overall, the purpose of policy developments 
along these lines is to proactively reduce the likely incidence of many social problems 
associated with overstaying. 
 Increased awareness of the strategic importance of globalisation in economics and 
political theory has contributed massively to policy development in second phase migration 
models. The advent of globalised circular migration has shifted the foundations of past 
assumptions regarding migrant behaviour, motivations and identity. Developments in 
technology and the growth of international remittance-sending by migrant workers have 
redefined the meaning of community membership as well as economic and political 
participation, in both home and host countries. This has resulted in the formation of what 
Levitt (2003) refers to as “transnational communities” (p. 262) – that is, expatriate groups 
that engage actively with social, economic and political affairs in both their home and host 
                                                          
10
 Another comparable example of second phase migration policy implemented in the Asia-Pacific region is 




countries. As Levitt (2000) explains, “Increasing numbers of migrants […] continue to 
participate in their homelands, even as they are incorporated into host countries. Rather than 
cutting off their social and economic attachments and trading one political membership for 
another, some individuals keep feet in both worlds” (p. 459). Globalisation has challenged 
traditional assumptions about the effects of national borders on transnational political 
activities, national identity and community identification. Second phase migration models 
accept the concept of “communities spanning borders” (Levitt, 2000, pp. 460-461), in which 
migrants enjoy flexibility to move with comparative ease between home and host countries, 
in contrast to the isolated and disempowered communities otherwise formed within host 
countries from which individual migrants find, for economic or practical reasons, that there is 
no incentive to return home. Second phase models propose that host countries opt to 
implement immigration policies that facilitate stronger individual and communal connections 
between migrant workers and home countries as a strategy to dissuade undocumented 
permanent settlement and indefinite overstaying. Correspondingly, second phase models 
incorporate revised incentive structures in order to attract the right kinds of temporary 
migrant labour, entailing acceptance of a permanent ‘cyclical’ migrant community presence. 
As Basok (2002) argues, this goal can be achieved by selecting and supporting migrants that 
retain strong incentives to remain actively involved in the economic and social affairs of their 
home countries. 
 In the case of first phase guest worker programmes, the central priority of 
immigration policy (from the perspective of host countries) was to supplement an already 
fully-employed workforce in order to maximise industrial output and contain labour costs and 
inflation (Stalker, 2000, p. 28). The need for greater numbers of workers in Europe in that era 
was also partly due to the loss of a generation of working-age people in the Second World 
War. In contrast, a key purpose of second phase migration models today is to secure 
substantial replacement workforces to make up for labour shortfalls in those highly-
developed economies suffering under the economic burdens of ageing and depopulation. It is 
important to discern that current labour shortfalls in highly-developed depopulating countries 
originate not from full domestic employment, but from a scarcity of working-age people. 
Shifts toward domestic employment in service sectors and away from the heavy industries 
that drove western (and Japanese) economic development prior to the 1970s have starved 
crucial economic sectors of labour resources. In Japan’s case, calls for immigration reform on 
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the massive scale proposed by the LDP’s Hidenao Nakagawa in 2008 demonstrate 
recognition of a need to recruit ‘replacement’ labour from abroad to make up for inevitable 
declines in the number of Japanese workers available and willing to work in Japan’s primary 
industries (Matsutani, 2008). Castles and Miller (1998) note the difficult position that 
confronts Japanese policymakers with regard to managing opposing pressures of tight 
immigration control and labour market stagnation; they identify “a contradiction between 
officially-stated aims of migration control and the tacit acceptance of undocumented inflows 
which meet labour market needs: this applies […] to current policies of several Asian labour-
importing countries” (pp. 93-94). 
This latter point summarises the substance of immigration policy in Japan at present: 
Japan’s policymakers have yet to effectively engage with the globalisation of migration since 
the 1970s. Japan’s binary ‘us-and-them’, ‘insider-outsider’ conceptualisation of world affairs 
has struggled to adapt to new realities of twenty-first century globalised population 
movement and community membership. By restricting and compartmentalising migrants, 
Japan has been unable to effectively capitalise on modern globalised patterns of labour 
movement. For the same reason, Japan has been unwilling to implement policy reforms that 
would minimise potential for overstaying by allowing unskilled migrants to build and 
maintain strong economic and sentimental connections both with Japan and with their 
countries of origin. 
 Japan’s ongoing official tolerance of “the ‘back door’ of irregular labour migration” 
(Castles, 2004, p. 216) runs counter to the projections and policy recommendations of second 
phase migration models. The current government policy platform on immigration, the Third 
Basic Plan for Immigration Control, persists with an inflexible policy principle of ‘no 
unskilled workers accepted’, and demonstrates little apparent recognition of Japan’s 
impending need for a revitalised working-age population. However, it must be noted that the 
Third Basic Plan does allow for de-facto undocumented employment of migrant workers in 
Japan outside the constraints of regulatory oversight. Japan’s current immigration regime 
facilitates the practice of hiring migrants abroad to enter Japan under the guise of ‘trainee’ 
and ‘intern’ employment programmes, producing a source of cheap labour for favoured 
industries without providing recognition or legal protections afforded to regular migrants that 
enter the country on conventional work visas (Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan, 2007). 
Continued tolerance for these irregular sources of migrant labour suggests policymakers still 
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view the interests of Japan’s economy and society in accordance with a policy framework 
that regards workers in terms of simple units of labour. Basok (2002) refers to the limitations 
of this view in relation to the experience of guest workers in the U.S. by pointing to 
employment contract violations, overworking, inadequate accommodation and other forms of 
worker exploitation as just a few of the outcomes to be expected from persisting with such a 
policy (pp. 225-226). Similar conditions have been observed in officially sanctioned ‘trainee’ 
employment programmes in Japan. In particular, media commentators have highlighted 
instances from Japan’s ‘trainee’ programmes where workers were forced to work in unsafe 
conditions, placed in substandard accommodation, had their passports confiscated and pay 
withheld, and suffered high rates of injury and death due to overwork (Tabuchi, 2010). 
Stephen Castles (2004) asks, “Why does the Japanese government not take effective 
measures to stop employment of undocumented workers? Administrative weakness does not 
seem to be a major reason. Nor is ignorance, when a casual observer can find streets where 
illegal day-labourers are hired by contractors every morning” (pp. 215-216). It seems that by 
persisting with policies that refuse migrant workers the protections of Japan’s labour laws 
(although these ‘trainees’ are unofficial guest workers in all but name), policymakers reveal 
an attitude to migration that has much more in common with first phase models described 
above than with contemporary second phase models. 
 This interpretation is further strengthened in review of Nikkei migrant worker 
treatment under Japan’s ‘special permanent resident’ visa regime. The 2008 recession-era 
policy encouraging Nikkei workers to return to their home countries in Latin America can be 
compared to planned compulsory removal of migrant workers under first phase guest worker 
models in Europe, where policymakers intended for migrant workers to be “recruited, utilised 
and sent away again as employers required” (Castles & Miller, 1998, p. 71). Overall, the 
Nikkei experience serves to expose the motivations of policies that evidently regard Nikkeijin 
as mere de-facto guest workers along the same lines as migrant workers in the first phase 
German Gastarbeiter model. Japan’s ‘special permanent resident’ immigration scheme has 
now generally come to be viewed as a failure because of labour and immigration policies 
“that ignored integration and assimilation” (Arudou, 2009). 
 Contemporary Japanese immigration policy falls into the conceptual gap between 
recognised failure of first phase temporary labour migration schemes, and proposed reforms 
of second phase models. In essence, Japan’s binary ‘us-and-them’ policy approach has 
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prevented Japanese policymakers from substantively engaging with second phase models of 
migration. Instead of striving to develop and adopt innovative strategies to integrate new 
legitimate migrant workers into Japan’s labour market, policymakers remain preoccupied 
with concerns of overstaying and the formation of undocumented foreign sub-communities. 
As discussed above, the primary cause of this preoccupation is an institutionalised fear of the 
political consequences of redefining Japan’s social makeup and national discourse of identity. 
In effect, Japan’s current immigration policies facilitate and encourage exactly those most-
feared outcomes – overstaying, illegal employment, migrant worker abuse, and inevitable 
associations of migrants with crime as a result of visa and residency violations. Meanwhile, 
political opposition to integration-based immigration reform remains very high. Essentially, 
Japan’s rigid ‘us-and-them’ policy orientation compels policymakers to respond to Japan’s 
demographic crisis and ageing society with a range of immigration policies that have already 
proven to be destructive failures elsewhere. As a result, there is perhaps little reason to 
believe that Japan will respond decisively to the economic and social consequences of 
depopulation and aging until profound changes occur in policymakers’ conceptions of the 
nature of Japan’s national identity and role in the wider global community. A philosophical 
change away from ‘us-and-them’ views of world affairs must be seen as a precondition to 
Japan’s successful adoption of second phase migration models, since the conceptual heart of 
those models is broad acceptance of universalised global values and norms, which in turn rely 
on willing acknowledgement of, investment in and engagement with other global actors and 











CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
I return now to the initial question posed at the beginning of this work: Why does Japan 
resist taking the necessary steps to introduce immigration and citizenship reforms that could 
help to alleviate the negative economic impact of population decline? The previous chapter 
has outlined the two key parts of my response to this question. These relate to the binary ‘us-
and-them’ mindset of Japan’s policymakers, and the failure of Japan to engage effectively 
with new labour migration models that have emerged from a growing acceptance around the 
world of globalised norms and evolving transnational identities in the twenty-first century. 
My interpretation in this work differs from conventional responses to the question, as 
outlined in Chapter Three. Arguments that link Japan’s attitudes to racism and xenophobia on 
the one hand, and belief in social homogeneity on the other, draw attention to important 
single aspects of Japan’s stance on immigration. However, they fail to specifically explain 
why Japan resolutely refuses to accept migrant workers while facing the onset of dire 
economic and demographic consequences of depopulation. That is to say, conventional 
analyses do not explain why Japan’s demographic crisis has not created sufficient incentives 
for substantive policy change. 
I have argued that Japan resists immigration reform because policymakers continue to 
base immigration policies around a series of assumptions first established in the immediate 
postwar period, when Japan adopted the Yoshida Doctrine and laid the groundwork for 
economic expansion. As its economy approached maturity in the 1970s and 1980s, Japan 
sought to employ migrant labourers without adapting the fundamental social and economic 
assumptions upon which the country’s economic success was initially built. These 
assumptions essentially match those of first phase labour migration theories; they are based 
on utilisation of migrant labour with little regard given to social integration of the migrants 
themselves. As a consequence, Japan’s policies today make no real allowance for strategic 
proactive social integration. The outcome of this has been the creation of an underclass of 
undocumented workers, migrant overstaying, exploitation by employers, and discrimination 
against migrants. These outcomes largely mirror the experience of Germany, the U.S. and 
other host countries that applied similar assumptions to their own postwar migrant worker 
schemes. Japan’s response to these outcomes has been to put greater emphasis on policing 
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migrant communities and cracking down on overstayers. Decisive action has yet to be taken 
to deal with the root causes of overstaying and undocumented employment. 
Academic theory and practical experience elsewhere suggest that Japan could benefit by 
implementing reforms associated with second phase labour migration policies. These reforms 
include greater recognition of migrant worker rights, more fluidity in migration flows, 
strategic selection of migrants (rather than simply hiring those willing to work for the lowest 
wages), and efforts to promote more widespread acceptance of multiculturalism in Japanese 
society. Reforms of this nature would soften the blunt, uncompromising ‘inside/outside’ 
dichotomy of current mainstream interpretations of Japanese national identity, and would 
allow Japan to become more responsive to globalised trends and developments. Crucially, 
they would also allow policymakers a far greater degree of flexibility in sourcing and 
managing labour from abroad as a response to demographic decline and depopulation. 
However, Japan has been prevented from implementing this kind of reform agenda 
because rigid ‘inside/outside’ social structures remain an entrenched feature of Japan’s social 
policies. These structures sustain an ideology of social homogeneity against multicultural 
pressures, and allow politicians and bureaucrats to consolidate popular support and 
legitimacy in a time of economic decline and high unemployment. They also act as 
justification for bureaucratic persistence with the status-quo in economic policy and 
governance. They are built on institutionalised distrust of ‘the other’ in government and 
society, and manifest in a series of policies that are firmly oriented toward keeping non-
Japanese influence at arm’s length.  
It is important to understand the reasons why Japan’s policymakers adhere to such a 
viewpoint. I have argued here that Japan’s binary, ‘us-and-them’ mindset is a product of 
historical, practical, cultural and political factors. Historical experiences of interaction with 
foreigners created a distrust of ‘non-Japanese’ actors that endures in government and society 
today. Practical implementation of immigration policy reinforces a self-fulfilling cycle of 
migrant failure to integrate with mainstream society, as migrants face overwhelming 
disadvantages in labour regulations and the workplace. This forms the basis of justifications 
for further exclusion of migrants from the labour market in Japan, and disincentivises hiring 
of migrant workers, even in those employment sectors suffering critical labour shortages. 
Failure to integrate is then used by politicians and bureaucrats as part of populist political 
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strategies to gain public support and to further marginalise migrants from mainstream society, 
thereby helping to rationalise the ideology of social homogeneity upon which policymaking 
in contemporary Japan is based. 
It is likely that Japan will have difficulty in adopting second phase immigration policies 
without also precipitating major changes in discourses of national identity. For example, 
Levitt’s conceptualisation of ‘transnational communities’ (as described in Chapter Four) is 
fundamentally incompatible with Japan’s current monoethnic and monocultural ideology 
because it demands a more ambiguous and flexible notion of national borders and community 
membership than current policy attitudes in Japan allow. The logic of second phase migration 
policy prescriptions only makes sense if one accepts the value of openness and engagement 
with globalised systems and communities, rejecting a competitive zero-sum conception of 
interactions between national communities on the world stage. However, Japan’s binary, ‘us-
and-them’ view of world affairs compels policymakers to persist with precisely that kind of 
competitive conception. That is to say, Japan’s binary mindset – perceiving Japan to be at 
odds with other nations collectively - necessarily conflicts with the idea of global 
communities and systems. 
In summary, the purpose of my analysis has been to explain how unfavourable social 
effects and outcomes of current policies (such as overstaying, undocumented employment 
and exploitation of migrants) serve to justify ongoing resistance to immigration reform in 
Japan, in spite of demographic decline and depopulation. Policymakers have fundamentally 
misunderstood how their policies have been responsible for producing many of these 
negative social effects and outcomes. However, an alternative policy orientation (that of 
second phase migration models) remains inaccessible to policymakers because the foundation 
of second phase models – open engagement with global communities and systems – is 
incompatible with the binary, ‘us-and-them’ mindset that continues to influence public 
policymaking in Japan. In essence, Japan persists with restrictive immigration policies 
because there is no better alternative available under present political conditions. A more 
effective alternative cannot be implemented until profound shifts occur among governing 
elites in perceptions of Japan’s national identity and role in the global community. 
So what are the implications of these conditions for Japan’s future? The relevance and 
practicality of Japan’s mindset is now challenged by emerging globalised systems that break 
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down many traditional assumptions about national interests and identity. Japan’s inwardly-
oriented approach to politics, economics and social issues served the country well in the 
period during which it developed from an impoverished postwar state to a world-leading 
economic power. However, monoethnic and monocultural values have served Japan poorly in 
terms of facilitating mutually-beneficial integration with other countries, cultures and 
economies. Such integration is a cornerstone of effective participation within the globalised 
world political economy of the early twenty-first century. Japan’s ongoing reluctance to 
accept migrants is symptomatic of a desire to maintain successful policy formulas of the past 
in spite of their steadily decreasing tenability in a present-day globalised context. 
I have argued that Japan’s binary ‘us-and-them’ view of interaction with the rest of the 
world is incompatible with effective engagement with global communities and systems. 
Instead of investing politically in globalised labour migration initiatives with other 
stakeholders around the world, Japan’s worldview isolates the country from benefits of global 
collective action and coordination. One of these benefits is emerging transnational population 
movement that connects willing labourers in developing countries with highly-developed 
economies that need new sources of working-age people in order to maintain high levels of 
economic productivity and to support burgeoning elderly and retired populations. By creating 
so many formal and informal restrictions on non-Japanese migrant labourers, Japanese 
policymakers have produced artificial disincentives for the most desirable and productive 
kinds of foreign workers to even consider Japan as a working destination.  
The basic reasons for Japan’s disinclination to participate in globalised trends originate 
from social ideology that developed to suit the demands of a very different era and set of 
economic circumstances. Ideas of Japanese monoethnicity, monoculturality and ‘harmony’ 
aided industrial recovery in the postwar period by replacing wartime ideologies of militarism 
and ultranationalism as sources of national identity and unification (Van Wolferen, 1989, pp. 
263, 267). This new ideology of social homogeneity contradicted Japan’s own long history of 
regional cultural and linguistic variation, but served the purpose of establishing a strong 
unified workforce that helped to enable massive industrial growth in Japan during the 
postwar economic ‘long boom’ period. Japanese isolationism, fear of ‘the other’ and political 
activism against migrants would perhaps have been less able to maintain traction in Japanese 
politics and society today without promotion of a collectivised view of the world outside 
Japan as an economic competitor (Van Wolferen, 1989, pp. 377-378). In this way, the idea 
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that migrants represent a threat to national ‘harmony’ has remained an enduring social by-
product of the economic compulsions of a previous era. 
In short, it can be argued that Japan persistently refuses to accept migrants today because 
of immigration and labour policies that are simply behind the times. The future inclination of 
political and bureaucratic leaders may very well be to persist with current policies and social 
views that deliberately insulate Japan from developing global norms and trends. The 
implication of this strategy is that by continuing further along the path of isolation and 
minimisation of contact with the global community, policymakers are likely to hasten the 
onset of the worst effects of demographic decline and depopulation. Whether that outcome 
will eventually lead Japan toward a new era of national self-examination and social 
inclusiveness, or to a progressively-hardening radical isolationism, remains to be seen. 
Discussion of immigration reform is thus tied intrinsically to discussion of Japan’s future 
national and cultural identities.  
 The primary purpose of this work has been to investigate why policymakers remain 
reluctant to reform Japan’s strict immigration regulations. Nevertheless, the question of how 
Japan could or should respond to the crisis also deserves brief consideration here. 
Policymakers today remain highly constrained by the principle of ‘no unskilled labour 
accepted’ contained in the Third Basic Plan for Immigration Control. That inflexibility has 
discouraged debate over alternative policy proposals that involve the use of migrant labour, 
even on a theoretical or hypothetical basis. If that central principle of the Third Basic Plan 
were to be modified to permit discussion of how migrants might best be integrated into 
Japan’s society and economy in the future, progress could be made toward developing 
innovative solutions without immediately coming into conflict with the principles that 
currently define Japan’s social policies. Change of this nature would necessarily represent a 
profound departure from Japan’s policymaking orthodoxy, and could create new 
opportunities to develop relevant and effective immigration policies that respond more 
realistically to Japan’s current demographic and economic situation.  
 Constructive debates addressing the utility of migrant labour in Japan under a newly 
liberalised immigration regime could also facilitate greater policy engagement with the global 
economy and community in other areas. Such a development might renew public 
conversation over Japan’s national priorities in the globalised era. 
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But how likely are Japan’s policymakers to pursue meaningful change? As pressing as the 
problem of population decline may appear, little urgency is evident on the part of politicians 
and bureaucrats to carry out decisive reforms before the economic effects of depopulation 
become impossible to ignore. Research outcomes on the willingness of the Japanese public to 
tolerate a greater migrant presence have produced mixed indications: Llewelyn and Hirano 
(2009) argue that public acceptance of a multicultural future for Japanese society is 
measurably increasing, particularly among Japan’s younger generations. In contrast, Tabuchi 
(2011) points to public opinion polls conducted in 2008 that found 65 percent of respondents 
opposed immigration reform, irrespective of the effects of depopulation (p. 2). Though the 
negative impacts of the demographic crisis are increasingly being felt in Japanese society, 
Tabuchi concludes that “Tokyo seems to have resigned itself to a demographic crisis that 
threatens to stunt the country’s economic growth [...] and bankrupt its social security system” 
(p. 1). As long as Japan remains in a state of low economic growth and high unemployment, 
it seems unlikely for political reasons that policymakers will be motivated to implement 
immigration reforms. For this reason, changes in the approach to immigration may ultimately 
become tied to broader patterns of generational change in Japanese society and politics in the 
twenty-first century. 
Japan’s demographic crisis and policy responses have important implications for further 
research into demographic decline in highly-developed countries. While Japan is at the 
leading edge of population decline as a social and economic issue, several other industrialised 
nations in Asia and Europe face similar demographic predicaments. Japan is an important 
contributor to the wider problem of population decline in Pacific Asia as a whole. Jones, 
Straughan and Chan (2009) categorise Japan together with the Republic of Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan as a group of Pacific Asian countries that suffer some of the lowest fertility rates 
seen anywhere in the world, and argue that these countries must increase fertility in order to 
ensure future economic sustainability (p. 5). These scholars propose that managed migration 
could effectively make up for population shortfalls in Pacific Asian countries, provided that 
fertility can be raised from current rates to levels closer to adequate population replacement 
rates (p. 17). This argument raises interesting possibilities for development of an interactive 
theoretical model that directly connects existing fertility growth initiatives to immigration 
policy reform in order to alleviate the effects of demographic decline. The function of this 
model would be to indicate how migrant labour might be utilised strategically to allow time 
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for ‘pro-natalist’ policies (Jones, et al., 2009, p. 3) to take effect. However, such a model 
would naturally be dependent on effective concurrent reversal of downward fertility trends in 
these countries. Further investigation into the parameters of an interactive ‘fertility/migration’ 
model would contribute substantially to existing academic literature on the subject of 
depopulation in highly-developed countries. 
Several highly-developed European countries also currently face pressing questions of 
how best to alleviate demographic decline in the twenty-first century. Germany, Italy, 
Sweden and Switzerland all suffer from high national median ages at levels comparable to 
that of Japan (United Nations, 2002, p. 17). Fertility rates in Northern and Western Europe 
have also declined well below replacement level since the 1970s (d'Addio & d'Ercole, 2005, 
p. 12). However, European approaches to social implications of depopulation differ markedly 
to those of Japan. For example, Soysal (2010) highlights universal values and tolerance of 
ethnic and cultural diversity as part of France’s recent discourse of national identity, as 
expressed in the national school history curriculum. That discourse acknowledges the 
diminishing stature of sovereignty relative to national identity, in favour of a pre-eminence of 
universalised human rights (p. 100). In Germany, cancellation of the Gastarbeiter programme 
in the mid-1970s gave rise to public debate over the ongoing social effects of a new 
multiculturalism in German society. One prominent thread of policy discussion in the 1980s 
was that Germany’s policymakers might proactively engage with poorer countries as part of 
strategies to promote economic development abroad and to incentivise migrant worker return 
(Teitelbaum & Winter, 1985, pp. 126-127). 
From these examples, it can be seen that highly-developed European countries face a 
similar need to establish policy structures that successfully balance demographic concerns 
with cultural debates over the impact of depopulation and labour migration on national 
identity. The critical point of difference between these countries and Japan is that 
institutionalised engagement with the E.U. has allowed most European countries 
opportunities and incentives to incorporate transnational population movement into modern 
conceptions of national identity. For this reason, forthcoming responses of policymakers in 
E.U. countries to demographic change are likely to be very different to those seen in Japan. 
The framework for these responses can already be seen in the European Commission Policy 
Plan on Legal Migration, a policy platform that tries to build the foundation of common – or 
at least coordinated – Europe-wide policies on highly skilled and seasonal workers, as well as 
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paid trainees. This platform is intended to “enhance the integration of legally residing 
immigrants in the E.U. by ensuring their fair treatment” (European Commission, 2007). 
Demographic decline and depopulation are likely to further evolve into urgent social and 
economic issues for highly-developed countries in the twenty-first century. The 
aforementioned examples of countries from Europe and Pacific Asia demonstrate how 
specific social and political conditions associated with depopulation differ considerably from 
region to region. However, assessment of Japan’s immigration policies raises the question of 
what other countries can learn from Japan’s current policy weaknesses. I contend that Japan’s 
immigration policies best serve to illustrate the dangers of persisting with policy strategies 
that may have worked well in the past, but that have since been overtaken by domestic and 
global political developments. The greatest benefit of studying Japan’s demographic crisis 
from the perspective of other highly-developed countries may ultimately be to assist in 
developing responsive, flexible ‘best practice’ immigration policy structures that effectively 
combine the economic and social priorities of those nations with furtherance of the interests 
and life prospects of migrants. 
At its core, Japan’s demographic crisis represents a critical historical juncture. The 
situation invites broad reinterpretation of Japan’s role in the world from the perspectives of 
domestic and foreign scholars of Japan, and from Japanese society itself. It is possible that 
the developing effects of the crisis will serve as a catalyst for reinvigorated discussion of the 
foundational values of Japan in the twenty-first century, and as an opportunity to redefine 
Japan’s national goals and identity in accordance with the existence of global communities 
and systems beyond Japan’s shores. By engaging more closely and cooperating with other 
countries and communities over the problem of depopulation, Japan would be in a position 
not only to alleviate its own demographic crisis, but to play a valuable role in establishing 
policy precedents that reduce the likelihood of other countries having to endure the same 
difficulties that Japan currently faces. As I have argued throughout this work, such an 
outcome depends largely on whether Japan’s policymakers can move away from a binary, 
‘us-and-them’ conception of the world. It remains to be seen whether demographic decline 
and the economic consequences of depopulation ultimately provide the motivation needed for 
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